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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

"A SOCIOECONOMIC STUDY OF THE
ENOCH VEGETABLE PROJECT."

by

(C)

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The undersigned certify that they have read and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies for acceptance, a thesis entitled "A Socioeconomic Study of the Enoch Vegetable Project," submitted by Gordon R. Banta, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science.

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ABSTRACT

The members of the Enoch Band are part of the Indian minority group in Canada. This study was designed to investigate the background and development of the Enoch Vegetable Project and to give an evaluation of the social and economic implications. The project was set up to supply work and to give the community something on which to build its self-confidence.

The study showed that the problems faced by the Band members prior to the start of the Vegetable Project made farming virtually impossible. The problem was aggravated further by the lack of job opportunities available on the Reserve. These factors contributed to a weakening of the economic and social fabric of the community.

The Vegetable Project although suffering a financial loss provided work and greater self-confidence which enabled Band members to overcome some of their earlier problems.

Considerably more success could have been achieved if the white Canadian society had provided greater understanding, effective administration and less paternalism.

It is recommended that from now on the Band members be directly involved in all decisions regarding the Vegetable Project and their ideas be used. The organization of the Project should be changed to reward those who do superior work in order to provide incentive.

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CHAPTER I

THE STONY PLAIN RESERVE AND THE ENOCH BAND

Description of the Reserve

Population and Land Utilization

This study was conducted on the Stony Plain Indian Reserve located three miles west of Edmonton. It is the home of the Enoch Band whose members are of Cree ancestry and are considered Plains Cree. In 1965 they numbered 420. Table 1 categorizes their population by age groups and compares these with the age distribution of the population of Alberta.

The Reserve, which is 20 square miles in area, had 9,000 of its 12,800 acres under cultivation in 1965. Of the 8,000 acres rented to farmers, about 7,000 acres were in cereal crops with an additional 1,000 acres in potatoes. One Band member farmed 160 acres, while a Co-op farm had 500 acres cultivated. The "Vegetable Project" involved 350 acres in 1965. Also a development firm rented 680 acres for Tomahawk Park (a recreation park) and the government leased 710 acres for a rifle range.

Soil


Over 4,000 acres of the soil of the Reserve is Ponoka Loam, an eluvated black soil with about 18 inches of top soil. This soil is rated very good to excellent in productive ability. It is considered the best soil in the Edmonton area and some of the choicest in Alberta. There are 5,189 acres of Number 7 soil including the 4,000 acres of Ponoka Loam. In addition, there are 4,539 acres of Number 5 soil, 2,272 acres of pasture and wasteland, and about 800 acres are taken up by Yekau Lake (Figure 1).

Table 1


 POPULATION BY AGE GROUPS FOR
 ALBERTA, INDIAN AND ESKIMO OF ALBERTA AND THE ENOCH BAND

Age Group	Alberta	Indian & Eskimo of Alberta	Enoch Band	Percentage		
				Alberta	Indian & Eskimo of Alberta	Enoch Band
0 - 4	179,888	5,726	77	13.5	20.1	18.4
5 - 9	159,053	4,526	72	11.9	15.8	17.1
10 - 14	130,383	3,678	55	9.8	12.9	13.1
15 - 19	99,004	2,914	55	7.4	10.2	13.1
20 - 24	89,154	2,299	38	6.7	8.0	9.0
25 - 34	192,511	3,412	54	14.4	12.0	12.8
35 - 44	172,623	2,097	27	13.0	7.4	6.4
45 - 54	128,547	1,630	23	9.7	5.7	5.5
55 - 64	87,643	1,167	10	6.6	4.1	2.4
65 - 69	31,724	411	2	2.2	1.4	0.5
70+	61,354	694	7	4.6	2.4	1.7
Total	1,331,944	28,554	420	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Census of Canada, Population, (Ottawa: 1961).



Source: Bowser, "Soil Survey of the Edmonton Sheet."



No. 7 Soil



No. 5 Soil



Pasture and Waste

Figure 1 SOIL RATING OF STONEY PLAIN INDIAN RESERVE

Included in the above acreages are about 3,200 acres of Winterburn Loam with a top soil depth of 25 inches and a rating of very good in productive ability. Due to the rolling topography only about 700 acres of the Winterburn Loam is rated as Number 7 soil; the rest is classed as Number 5. Some of the Number 5 soil includes 2,000 acres of Winterburn and Leith fine sandy loam. The pasture and wasteland is marsh, organic soil, or Leith loamy sand.¹

Climate

The climate of the area is characterized by relatively warm summers and cold winters. The mean summer temperature from May to September inclusive, is 56°F. The average frost free period is about 100 days, with an extreme variation from about 50 to 150 days. The growing period for cool season vegetables, calculated on a mean daily temperature of 42°F., is about 175 days.

The mean annual precipitation is about 17 inches with a range between 9 and 30 inches. About 70 percent of the precipitation falls as rain. June, July, and August are the months of heaviest rainfall, averaging just over nine inches. There is an average of 2,175 hours of sunshine per year, 45 percent of the possible hours of sunshine. During the growing season about 60 percent of the possible hours of sunshine is received.²

¹W. E. Bowser, "Soil Survey of the Edmonton Sheet," (Edmonton: University of Alberta, 1962).

²Ibid.

Oil and Gas

The Stony Plain Reserve, so wealthy in farmland and fortunate in climate, has another valuable natural resource--oil. Oil was discovered on the Reserve about 1950. In July 1965 there were 38 producing oil wells and four gas wells on the Reserve from which the revenue was about \$150,000 a year.

Sources of Revenue

Moreover, additional revenue accrues from agricultural land leased to white farmers. This income ranges between \$60,000 and \$100,000 a year. The land leased for a rifle range and park brings in \$6,240 yearly so the Band receives between \$210,000 and \$250,000 annually from the sale and lease of natural resources. In June 1965 the Band funds amounted to over \$1,300,000, held in trust by Indian Affairs.

However, the Enoch Band has not always been quite so affluent. Prior to the discovery of oil in 1950 the Reserve formed a relatively isolated small rural community. Before 1950 most Band members had only limited contacts with the rest of society. Following the discovery of oil and the beginning of land rental to non-Indian farmers, Band members were assured an income which considerably changed their way of living.

Enoch Band Reserve Before 1965

In order to understand the outcome, and to plan for the future of the Enoch Band Vegetable Project, it is necessary to relate the present situation on the Reserve to that before 1965.

Farming

Band members have farmed on the Reserve for a long time. Up to the end of World War II it appears that agriculture on the Reserve was much the same as that of the average farming area adjacent to the Reserve. The fields were small and scattered because Band members cleared only land that had few trees and little undergrowth. At a meeting of Band members called by the Indian Agent in 1945, they were told that the number of acres farmed in 1945 was less than the number farmed in 1940. Fences were not being kept up, and there was a resulting loss of crops because cattle were getting into the fields. Moreover, farmers were not taking care of their farm buildings, some of which had been allowed to deteriorate badly. Not only did this situation exist in 1945, but the same theme can be found in the present correspondence.

It is important here to note the conditions under which the Band members were trying to farm, because these conditions help to explain many of the poor farming methods and the apparent inefficiency of Band farmers. For instance, on November 28, 1952, a Band member signed all the necessary papers for a loan to purchase a machine, but did not receive the loan until October 24, 1953. In the meantime, (as noted beside the transaction in the books) his summerfallow could not be worked. (In conversation with the man the author learned that the machine was a disk.)

Another situation of this type occurred in April of 1953. A Band member applied for a loan to purchase a double disk. He signed four copies of the application for the loan and two copies of the assignment of interest. The Superintendent wrote a letter of recommendation,

the Regional Superintendent wrote a letter of recommendation, and three copies of indenture were signed on September first. When the Band member finally received the machine on October 24, 1953, a bill of sale by the seller, a letter from the Superintendent of Reserves and Trusts, and an order to supply from the Indian Agent were written.

A final example involves a letter of complaint written in 1953 by a Band member to the Indian Agent regarding the selling of feed.

We have to go ten miles into Edmonton to weigh the grain before we can sell it. [And] most of the feed is sold in the Winterburn area which means the feed is hauled about 18 miles.

Furthermore, at that time all the hauling was done with horses. It takes only a few such examples to convince Band members that farming on their own is not worth the risk.

In 1952 Agricultural leases were granted to surrounding farmers to farm Reserve land. At the time comments such as "agriculture is the mainstay of Indians on the Reserve, and any development along sound business lines is a step in the right direction and will prove to be of value in the years to come" were commonly heard. However, the leasing did not have the desired effect. Band members observed certain things about their white neighbors. Outside the Reserve farmers had freedom to change and make adjustments, a fact that is essential to successful farming. Agriculture was booming, and farmers were purchasing new and more efficient equipment to farm the larger acreages available on the Reserve. Non-Indian farmers did not have to spend days filling out forms and waiting months to have a request filled for new machinery. The farmer off the Reserve had only to spend an hour or so at a bank to discover if he could have a new machine.

By 1955 a feeling of resignation seems to have set in among Band members. The following statement is found in the Agency books about that time. "It is doubtful if the Band will benefit if more of their land is cleared and broken by non-Indians." Another comment made in September 1953 emphasizes the point that not only Band members realized that Indian farming could not compete. "On the whole most Indians do not farm sufficient acreages or have enough machinery to make their efforts economically sound."

Though land was being leased to non-Band members, there was always help available to members from the Indian Affairs Branch for those who wanted to start farming. From 1954 to 1960 six men were given machinery costing a total of \$40,000 to start farming. All six Band members failed. Most of the Indian Affairs people felt that the failures were due to poor management. For instance, tractors were used to go to the bootleggers in Edmonton. Grain was sold and the money spent before any bills were paid. Implements disappeared. The variability of figures in table 2 gives some indication of the Band members inability to decide whether to farm on their own or rent to outsiders.

Table 2

ACREAGES REGISTERED WITH CANADIAN
WHEAT BOARD BY BAND MEMBERS

Year	Acreage
1951	611
1952	462
1953	618
1954	686
1955	328
1956	105
1957	652
1958	879
1959	860
1960	352
1961	725
1962	735
1963	550
1964	125

In 1963 the Superintendent suggested at a Council meeting that a Co-op farm might be set up. This idea was taken up by five of the men, and in May 1965 a Co-op farm was officially started. The Council set aside five quarters for the Co-op farm. Out of a total of 800 acres, 554 were cultivated. It was decided that they should seed 469 acres and summerfallow 85 acres. Machinery worth \$17,300 was purchased, and the Band set aside \$5,500 for operating expenses. All money from sales of Co-op farm produce were to be deposited at the Agency, where one-half would be collect until the debts were paid off. It was expected that during the first year's operation sales would come to \$14,000, which would leave the members profits of \$7,000 or \$1,400 each. In a latter resolution it was decided that one dollar per hour would be paid first for all labour out of the one-half share coming to the members. Despite the planning the Co-op did not function well and was disbanded after the first year. There were no books kept. When the time came to pay the Band, one member of the Co-op who had been elected foreman and bookkeeper estimated the returns to be about \$4,484.52. Considering the 469 acres that were seeded, this seems a very low figure. Only \$624.52 of this was sold through the Agency. It was mentioned in a Council meeting that the Co-op farm was \$3,000 short of meeting operating expenses.

Education

When a teenager on the Reserve was asked what he thought most teenagers on the Reserve wanted, he replied "A good time, lots to drink, and no work, just like our parents." This teenager has known the Band members as friends since his first remembrances and does not look down on them. To him his comment was a statement of fact.

Unfortunately, for many it is true. The author asked one eighteen-year-old boy what he was going to do this winter, and his response was "nothing, why should I." A mother talking about her son said "we want him to go to school, but he wants to stop and buy a car. I guess we can't stop him, as everyone else his age is doing this." In 1965-66 there were nine students between 15 and 19 attending school out of a possible 55.

There are the conditions that exist 11 years after children of the Enoch Band were first sent to the Jasper Place Separate School Board schools. For a few years grade one and two continued at the local school, but now all students go to Jasper Place for their schooling. A kindergarten has been started on the Reserve to attempt to put the children in a more receptive frame of mind for starting grade one. The transporting of Band children to Jasper Place schools was started in the hope that educating them in a non-Indian school would modify some of their antagonism toward non-Indians. It was hoped that this antagonism would be reduced by association of Indian with non-Indian children.

There was resistance to this integration both among the Band members and among whites. In 1958 the following comment was made, "the non-Indian public continues to show considerable resistance to integration." Non-Indian parents for example, claimed that some Indian children had lice (a fact which was substantiated in 1962 when a Band girl was sent home for this reason).

Integration was hardest for the first students sent to the city school. Young adults on the Reserve told of humiliation inside the classroom and out. Teachers commented publicly that Indian students did something "because they did not know any better." They were often

demoted a grade or two. During recesses and noon hours on the playground where Band children could compete individually, Indian students held their own. However, back in the classroom the student was again made aware of his position. At noonhour there was another problem, that of lunches. There is a definite social order based on the contents of lunch kits. In the hierarchy there is the boiled potato on the lowest level, then pancakes left over from breakfast, graduating up to sandwiches with jam, and finally meat sandwiches. The meagre contents of their lunches placed Indian children on the bottom of the social rung. What had been a fine lunch in the rural school, caused humiliation in Jasper Place. Since lunches were an excuse given by many of the students for being truant, the Band Council started making noon lunches for the children. In this way the children were assured of at least one good meal a day. It is well known that children suffering from hunger do not learn as easily as well fed children, and a case was reported in 1961 in Jasper Place of an Indian student fainting from hunger.

Furthermore, Indian students had study problems at home. There was no quiet place to study. It is mentioned in Council minutes and correspondence six times that teenagers simply cannot do their homework at home. Some asked that soundproof partitions be put into their homes to give one quiet room for study. In 1965-66 there were about 420 people living on the Reserve in about 50 residences, indicating that there were 8.4 people per house, and over 35 percent of the people were under 15 years of age. Thus it is quite easy to see why they have trouble. Nor has the problem been resolved to any great extent. On September 24, 1963, the principal caught eight truants. In 1966 eight truants were caught stealing candy.

Social Activities.

Clubs and organizations have been started on the Reserve; however, none of them have lasted very long. In 1954 a Social Welfare worker organized a teen club, to which the Band Council gave \$50.00 for records. It soon disbanded. The R.C.M.P. started a boy's boxing club. It lasted until the policeman who started the club was transferred. Other short-lived organizations and ideas can also be listed. In 1963 the Band approved \$680.00 for ballet instruction and \$30.00 for a record player; but interest soon waned. In 1964 Saint John's Ambulance came to the Reserve to teach first aid; but no one came for the first night of instruction.

There seems to be a pattern to these organizations and their demise. Someone outside the Reserve may decide that a certain club, organization, or interest is what the Band needs, or possibly a Band member may take a course off the Reserve or in some way be excited by the possibilities of some organization. So a club, group, or organization will be started, the individual with the idea taking most of the responsibility. When the initiator leaves or becomes disinterested, the organization disintegrates.

An interesting organization on the Reserve now is the Enoch Band. One young man started and financed this band; he collects the Band members and transports them to dances. Although the Band is quite successful, he has an extremely hard time keeping the members together and in a condition to play.

For instance, the band has been playing at the local hall for teenagers. Unfortunately many adults come, and several fights have broken out. Because of this the Band Manager has stopped playing

at the hall. If he were to let up in his efforts, the band would immediately stop. In another effort a Band member organized a baseball team for girls under 15, in the summer of 1966. They were in a league with the surrounding towns. He also faced the same organizational problems. He received little or no help. He picked the girls up, took them to the games, and brought them home. There was little financial help from any source, though the Band did buy some equipment.

Economics of the Band

Previously in this Chapter, mention was made of the Band's sources of revenue, which are considerable. In this section certain typical examples will be used to demonstrate what use the Band members are making of their incomes.

By 1951 (when the Reserve had 14 producing oil wells) Band members were receiving \$12 per person per month. Moreover, as Canadian citizens the Band members received Baby bonuses and Old Age and war pension cheques. As is evident in Table 3, Band members have considerable income, all of which except for the \$820 treaty money, comes from the sale and lease of natural resources on the Reserve.

An example of the use to which Band members put their money before 1965 was found in the narrative of an Indian Affairs employee. He noted that often 30 taxis would line up outside the Agency on payday to transport Band members into the city as soon as they received their money. Also lease money, which usually came all at once, was used for spending sprees in town. By 1955 the interest payment had been raised to \$20.00, and a special payment of \$35.00, a Debt Reducing Interest Payment, was being distributed. Furthermore, a "game" had evolved among Band members. Any means was sanctioned to elicit Band money for individual

Table 3

INCOME TO BAND MEMBERS IN 1965

(in dollars)

Interest Money	100,800
Surface Lease Oil	5,942
Agricultural Lease	20,269
War Pension	1,438
Treaty Money	820
Baby Bonus	16,488
Old Age Pension	6,300
Food Orders	7,000
Relief	1,500
Student Allowance	2,500
Transportation	2,644
Noon Lunches	7,000
Furniture Grant	1,800
Chief Council and Secretary plus labor wage paid by Band	8,060

In addition the Band Supplies:

Power for old people	2,000
Housing Repairs	3,000
Funerals	1,500
Glasses and Dentures	800
Maintenance of cemetery	650
Hall equipment	300
Weed control	500
Fire Fighting	500
Insurance on Buildings	1,000
Village Street Lighting	400
Repairs on all equipment	1,000
Natural Gas	450
Repairs to Roads	5,000
New Roads	4,500
Rural Electrification Association and Power Line	2,750
Miscellaneous	10,000
Total cash to Band members	173,761
Other benefits to Band members paid by Band on yearly basis	33,150

In addition, the Band supplies 50 houses (all 3 bedroom or larger with running water and electricity), costing \$460,000; 25 miles of new road (since 1953), costing \$150,000; a church and hall (built in 1960), costing \$75,000; sewer and water in the village, costing \$65,000: Total Capital Expense, \$750,000.

Band members. Though some Band members might miss out on one payment, they knew they could receive help from those who had managed to get more money. Some Band members became very efficient at the "game" and managed to receive a substantial income for their efforts. An example of this extortion can be found in the 1965-1966 charges for transportation to hospital. Two thousand, six hundred and forty-two dollars and fifty cents was spent from Band funds transporting Band members to hospital. The rate paid was \$3.50 per trip. Therefore, 755 people went to the hospital in one year. One man apparently made four trips in 30 minutes.

This attitude of spending whatever you get when you get it was reinforced when the Band set up a loan scheme. Anyone could obtain a mid-month loan to carry him through the month. There was little thought of repayment on these loans; the agency took the money owed off the next month's allotment. Thus the debtor felt no responsibility toward what he owed. Spend what you get they seemed to feel, for others have already taken all they can. The steady source of income seems to have destroyed the art of money management, made extortion a game, and destroyed the people's drive and initiative to save.

CHAPTER II

ENOCH BAND PROBLEMS AND THE VEGETABLE PROJECT STUDY

General Minority Group Problems

The Canadian Indian is a member of a minority group, and as such he is often the target for prejudice. For the Indian there are two closely related, but distinguishable, consequences of prejudice. These are (1) the effect of prejudice on the personality traits of the individual, and (2) the effects of prejudice on the structures and processes of the minority group.¹ Since the personality of an individual is nearly developed by the time he is fifteen years old, to explain or judge the behavior of an adult without a thorough understanding of his childhood experiences is to miss basic causes. If the dominant elements of North American society or any other society isolate a segment of the population from contact with prevailing norms and prevent that segment from sharing in the rewards which accrue to the adherence to these norms, the appearance of a subculture with different motivations and standards of conduct should not come as a surprise.²

There is a sense of pessimism among the people. The young feel that they must or will fall into the same patterns as their elders. Sociologists tell us that the aimless living, laziness and uncleanness found on many reserves is not the fault of the Indians but comes from the normal frustration of minority groups faced with low-income living.³

¹ G.E. Simpson and Milton Yinger, Racial and Cultural Minorities, (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 130.

² Ibid., p. 137.

³ James Mulvihill, "The Dilemma of Our Indian People," Le Droit, (Ottawa), p. 21.

Certain Canadian policies established for all Indians have contributed to the "frustration of [Indians as] minority groups faced with low-income living."¹ Reserve living, for example, tends to isolate the Indian, keeping him constantly aware of his minority group status and forces him to miss many socioeconomic opportunities open to the dominant group. He often feels insecure²--an insecurity caused by the prejudice an Indian encounters from childhood.

In every region [of Canada] I found a deep rooted prejudice against them, a prejudice that was stronger in some places than in others but one which was noticeable everywhere from Atlantic to Pacific. It was strongest in the West.³

"You understand the Indian people better when you realize that they live in constant fear of prejudice and that they have no united front against this terror because they live [or were brought up] on [socially] isolated reserves."⁴

Moreover, the Indian Act segregates the Indian population, giving them separate laws and a separate government branch to administer them. Indian leaders have been left with little responsibility and no authority. There is little local or tribal government left, and therefore no leadership or leadership training on the reserves. An adequate education is a prerequisite of any leader, and an Indian dealing with educated governmental employees should have enough formal education to communicate with them on an equal basis. But the men who should be taking

¹Ibid., p. 137.

²Mulvihill, op. cit., p. 4.

³Diamond Jenness, Canadian Journal of Economics, XX (1954), p. 95.

⁴Mulvihill, op. cit., p. 5.

over tribal leadership have not received an adequate education. One possible explanation for this lack of education may be found in the following excerpt from a letter written in 1940 by a member of the Department of Indian Affairs.

The Department doubts the advisability of encouraging the older pupils to proceed along academic lines. Under the circumstances, the books required are not being supplied. It is felt that when pupils reach the age of 12 or 14 years, the school management should emphasize vocational rather than academic training for Indian students.

The Indian Problem

If their diet was deficient, their health poor, their housing unsatisfactory, it was the fault of the white man, they said, and the white man's government should set things right. So it came about that an atmosphere of mingled apathy and discontent had settled on the reserves, and it was apathy that dominated.¹

Thus a "segregation camp mentality" is slowly built up. The feeling of "apathy" mentioned by Jenness is one of the most serious aspects of what is commonly referred to as the "Indian Problem". Laskin breaks the problem down into three categories: cultural-ethical, biological, and motivational.² The cultural-ethical aspect concerns the decision by Indians to retain as much of their culture as they wish, or to transform themselves into average Canadians. The biological part of the problem is very simple. The reserves are becoming overpopulated.

A solution for the motivational part of the Indian Problem is the most difficult to foresee. A great deal of research has been

¹Jenness, op. cit., p. 98.

²Richard Laskin, Social Problems, (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Co., 1964), pp. 87-88.

devoted to the source of achievement motive, the readiness to work hard and postpone immediate satisfactions in order to get ahead. Three generalizations can be made on the basis of the data gathered: (1) class is more important than race or ethnic group in determining the strength of the achievement motive; (2) an important line of demarcation can be drawn between lower-lower and upper-lower class (a line of special significance among non-whites); and (3) the desire for achievement is not always accompanied by the expectation of achievement.¹ In the attitude of shame and apathy that prevails on many reserves, one can see that the achievement motive no longer exists for many Indians. Their attitude can easily be traced to its origins: (1) the collapse of the traditional tribal culture with its unique values, symbols of achievement, socialization stages, and structuring of motivation, meaning, and life that it involved; (2) the introduction of the white man's religion, education, and generally his norms, which often condemned as diabolical and pagan the Indian's culture, or simply ignored it as unworthy of official acknowledgement; and (3) the encounter with jobs and wages involving new skills and work disciplines which, because they were initially difficult to master, earned for Indians the stigma of lazy, stupid, and good-for-nothing. Thus for many the reserves have become havens from the loneliness, contempt, and failures of life outside--sanctuaries that offer subsistence and relief rations, perhaps shamefully but stoically received.²

¹ Simpson, op. cit., p. 145.

² Laskin, op. cit., pp. 87-88.

Problems of the Enoch Band

Farming or Renting

The members of the Enoch Band have encountered all the problems and suffered from all the injustices mentioned. One of the first things to look at in a rural community is how the land is being farmed. Some of the land of the Reserve has been and still is rented to non-Indian farmers. The renting of farmland to non-Indian farmers has affected the Band members in two ways. Either the high yields that came from the white farmers' new techniques motivated the Band members to try farming their own land, or they became discouraged by the success of the non-indian farmers and felt it was hopeless to try farming for themselves.

If a Band member wished to farm his own land, he could receive a Certificate of Possession from the government. However, even a Band member with the best of intentions met governmental red tape, inability to get the right machinery at the right time, and the social pressure on the Reserve against saving money--factors which ultimately would discourage him from farming. Therefore, after Band members took back the land for a year or two to make an attempt at farming it, they often turned it over to a white renter when the Certificate of Possession was theirs. In this way the Indian received all the ^{rental receipts from one land} ~~proceeds of the land for himself~~. Also, on giving evidence of serious intent to farm the land Band members were given sets of machinery. Often this machinery was sold or traded. Once Band members were assured an adequate income, they began to play games with Indian Affairs to see how much of their money they could get back from the Trust set up for them in Ottawa.

Money Management

Until a few years ago Enoch Band members had been able to manage their money well enough to carry them through. However, the attitude developed that when a person gets some money, he is expected to spend it. With a few exceptions the people spend their money as soon as they receive it and expect the Indian Affairs Branch to pay their debts from their oil dividends. This system has pyramided to the extent that a special fund was set up to allow a Band member to borrow from the Band Council to carry him through until the end of the month. Thus nearly all semblance of financial management within the Band has broken down.

Other Social Problems

There are many individuals who are only too happy to assist Indians in extorting more money from Indian Affairs and to trade them anything for liquor. Often Band members are cheated or used by these whites. Though they realize this, Band members continue to trade with these whites because at least they treat them well and do not openly discriminate against them.

The feeling of social isolation has been accentuated and made obvious to the Indians after 1950. After that time the increased revenue of the Band allowed more Band members to come into the city. In Edmonton which became their trading center after 1950, the Band members met prejudice. They were told that they were different and inferior to the rest of society. Naturally this built up a feeling of hostility among the Band members.

In an attempt to alleviate these hostile feelings, Indian children beyond grade two were transferred from the Catholic Residential School (which they had been attending to the age of 15 or until they

ran away, the latter usually being the case) to the separate schools in Jasper Place. However, this move created more problems for the children. Firstly, the residential school had been teaching at a low level. Many children were dropped back one or two grades on moving to Jasper Place. Secondly, the high standard of living and greater sophistication of the urban children reflected unhappily on the rural Band children. For example, the Band children were ashamed to open their lunch boxes, because the contents could not compete with that of the Jasper Place students. Finally, the children were subjected to the discrimination experienced by minority groups when they enter new areas. The result was a high level of truancy which still exists today.

It is obvious that a multitude of problems existed in 1965, the time of the inception of the Vegetable Project. The Family Service Bureau of Edmonton spent nearly two years working with Band members. When they advised a person to return to his community and improve himself he could not, because there was no place for a person to turn to get the backing needed to help change his way of life. The Family Service Bureau reports stated these facts and suggested that some type of project be developed, where members of the Band could work. These reports stimulated Indian Affairs to start looking at various alternatives. One of their first steps was to hold meetings with the Band members. At these meetings certain facts were stated:

- (1) In 1963 between 40 and 50 children were wards of the government.
- (2) Between five and eight percent of the people were in jail constantly.
- (3) Only one man was actively farming his own land.

- (4) Drinking was becoming an increasing problem every year.
- (5) Few men had jobs for longer than a month; some were not working at all.

There was no work on the Reserve, and when men left the Reserve to work, family trouble developed. Renting the land earned the Band members more money than farming it themselves. When the entire family left the Reserve for over a year to find work, the benefits received from Indian Affairs were cut off.

After the problems had been so stated and discussed, the idea of a Vegetable Project emerged. The Project was suggested and finally chosen for these reasons:

- (1) There was not enough work to keep the forty men who needed work busy.
- (2) Though only six hours of labor are required to produce an acre of grain, it takes 160 hours of labor to produce an acre of carrots.
- (3) Edmonton imports 90 percent of the carrots sold in its markets; 400 carloads of onions are imported into Alberta each year.
- (4) A few farmers had found that they could grow vegetables successfully in the Edmonton area; renting farmers had proved that Reserve land was suitable for raising potatoes.

Vegetable Project Study

At the beginning of the Project in 1965, Indian Affairs was concerned that some record be kept of the progress of the Project, its problems and any improvements that could be made in the scheme. Thus, on May first 1966, the Indian Affairs Branch authorized the Department of Agricultural Economics at the University to analyze the Vegetable Project. The object of the analysis was to evaluate the social and economic environment of the Enoch Band since World War II, to analyze the economics

of the Enoch Band Vegetable Project, to evaluate the levels of communication and the working relationships between each level of the Band and between the Band and Indian Affairs, and to recommend new agricultural programs designed to enhance Enoch Band resources. The study was to consider particularly the benefits and costs of the Project in terms of evaluating the economic efficiency of present development, the social benefits derived from the Project, and the potential development of land resources to obtain maximum returns for the residents of the Stony Plain Indian Reserve.

All information for this study except part of the economic data, was gathered by using non-directive interviewing. No formal questionnaire was prepared. During a seven month period Band members, local farmers, businessmen, members of the various committees concerned, and members of the staff of the Edmonton Indian Agency were contacted by the author. Discussions took place on an informal basis. During the discussions no notes were taken, and the interviewer did not lead the discussion after his interests were stated. To make this type of study, the interviewer lived on the Reserve and attempted to take part in most community activities where ideas and opinions might be exchanged.

Economic and other data was obtained from Band, Agency, and personal files. The economic analysis follows the style of other studies done in the area so comparisons can be made easily. Much of the economic data has been broken down into a detailed analysis to show how the figures were computed and to make it possible for a continuing comparison to be made in future years.

CHAPTER III

COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

Certain generalizations concerning Community, especially Rural Development, are of value here since the Vegetable Project is, after all, a Project intended to affect and benefit an entire community. Community Development has been described as:

The process by which the efforts of the people themselves are united with those of the government authorities to improve the economic, social and cultural condition of communities to integrate these communities into the life of the nation and to enable them to contribute fully to national progress.¹

It is important to keep in mind that one is working with the community as a whole; it is the community that is to be integrated into the life of the nation, not the individuals that are to be extracted from the community by some aspect of the community development process. The word process refers to a progression of events that are planned by the participants to serve goals they progressively choose. The events point to changes in a group and in individuals that can be termed growth in social sensitivity and competence.² This process usually follows a fairly definite pattern if it is successful. There are six major stages in the process: exploration, organization, discussion, action, new projects, and finally continuation.³

¹ B. Mehta, "Thoughts on Community Development," Khrukshetra, XII, (1964) p. 2.

² William W. Biddle and Laureide J. Biddle, The Community Development Process, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), p. 79.

³ Ibid., p. 90.

During the exploratory stage as much information as possible is gathered about the community. This information would include social and cultural attributes of the community, history of past projects, activities presently occurring, some data on the physical resources of the community, and those problems that the people feel are most pressing.

During the organizational stage the few really interested people hold many formal and informal discussions until they reach the point of committing themselves to work on a problem. This is usually a very small group referred to as the nucleus. After this nucleus has committed itself, the discussional stage is initiated. As many people as possible are involved in discussions of the problem. This is perhaps the most important single stage, for if the general community does not feel that they have had part in the decisions, they may not involve themselves actively in the project. Usually outside help is brought in to give technical advice, but final decisions must be left to the community.

Action follows decision. In this stage people work on their own ideas to successfully change and develop the community. With success comes self-confidence. If this stage is successful, the people are ready to go on to the next stage--developing new projects. Hopefully the community will develop a pattern for future problem solving which will build a strong community and, in turn, strong people.¹

¹Nelson Lowry, Charles Verner, Coolie Verner, Community Structure and Change, (New York: Macmillan Company, 1962), p. 441.

Community Development Among the Enoch Band

How does the process of Community Development apply to the Enoch Band Vegetable Project? As mentioned in Chapter I, it was the efforts of the Family Service Bureau that stimulated the Indian Affairs Branch to begin looking for solutions to some of the problems on the Reserve. The organizational stage of Community Development followed initiation of interest by the Family Service Office, and subsequently meetings were held with Band members. The problems were evaluated (as listed in Chapter I), and the idea of the Vegetable Project emerged as a possible solution.

Assistance was solicited at this point from the Department of Sociology at the University of Alberta. When the author discussed the Project with members of the Sociology Department, he found them to be favourable toward the Project per se but felt that it was not being started in keeping with Community Development principles. One man mentioned that the priest involved might have backed the Project too enthusiastically and forced his views on Band members. The Band council spent a great deal of time individually trying to convince those not in favour of the Project of its worth, but no excess pressure was applied in these cases.

Outside Assistance

Also in the discussion stage, the Superintendent solicited help from the Dean of the Faculty of Agriculture at the University of Alberta. Since the project was solely for the production of vegetables, the Dean turned the responsibility over to the Head of Horticulture Division. A committee composed of four sub-committees with three members each was soon organized. The Committee was named the Indian

Agricultural Projects Advisory Committee and was composed of the Production, Marketing, Processing, and Indian Affairs sub-committees. At this time there was confusion over the responsibilities of these groups. Moreover, up to the time of writing the members of the Indian Agricultural Projects Advisory Committee were not aware that the manager was responsible to them. A member of the Committee stated that the only reason a Committee had been formed was to give some prestige to the Superintendent's recommendations by using the name of the University in the title of the Committee. When told of their responsibility, another Committee member (on the Committee for two years) stated that he doubted whether any of the members would have agreed to sit on the Committee if they had known the responsibilities involved.

Goals

Though the delineated responsibilities of the Advisory Committee have been subjected to varying interpretations, certain goals for the Project have been outlined in this group. First of all, the Vegetable Project should be a profitable scheme, supply work, and give people pride and self-confidence. It should supply work for older men who cannot get work elsewhere. The Project should teach the Band members business methods and agriculture. Moreover, the Vegetable Project should help Band members acquire the habits necessary for integration into white society. Though this Project should provide work for all who wish to work, it should also become profitable by the third year.

In the Community Development process a final decision on what method of Community Development to use must be made before action is taken to implement the decision. At a general meeting the Band made the decision to go ahead with the Vegetable Project. Soon after their

decision several informative papers appeared outlining the problem on the Reserve and stating the goals of the Vegetable Project. The following list states the goals as conveyed to the author by the various members of the Indian Affairs Branch staff:

- (1) The Vegetable Project will make it possible for a person to learn to succeed in his own cultural environment on a competitive basis with a non-Indian community.
- (2) The Vegetable Project will provide gainful employment on the Reserve by projects capable of producing a profit to build a stable economy upon which a society can build a better way of life.
- (3) The Vegetable Project will develop an Indian system wage economy communal to stabilize Reserve society.
- (4) The Vegetable Project will develop sound work habits to make them better orientated to seek employment off the Reserve.
- (5) The Vegetable Project will put money into Band funds and so stop wasteful sprees etc. of Band members.
- (6) The Vegetable Project will make better use of land resources.
- (7) The Vegetable Project will provide a sense of achievement and pride.
- (8) The Vegetable Project will make better use of the million dollars in Band funds.
- (9) The Vegetable Project will help Indian Affairs, charged with the responsibility of helping the Indians solve their problems of unstable work habits etc. It will change the cultural pattern so that Indian people will be effective workers with skills to sell.
- (10) The Vegetable Project will become a profitable business by the third year.

One can see that the goals stated by two groups deeply involved with the Band Project are somewhat similar. A third group--The Farm Trust--also envisioned goals for the Project much like those of the Indian Affairs Branch and the IAPAC. The Farm Trust was the body that was to administer the Vegetable Project in 1966, manage its money, and plan

and make decisions on land allocation, crops to be planted, etc. It was to be made up of three farmers and two Band members. The members of the Farm Trust were nominated by the Band and an election held which was open to all Band members. Members of the Farm Trust felt that the goals of the Vegetable Project were (1) to teach money management; (2) to give the Indians work on a scheme that would at least break even; (3) to give them some way to constructively take part in white society; (4) to teach the Band members how to run an efficient operation, and (5) to employ all the workers anxious to work.

The Band member's goals, as conveyed to the author, were quite similar to those stated previously.

- (1) The Vegetable Project will teach us to handle our own affairs.
- (2) The Vegetable Project will make it easier for an individual to get some of his share of money from Ottawa.
- (3) The Vegetable Project will allow us to take over our own land.
- (4) The Vegetable Project will supply employment for Band members.
- (5) The Vegetable Project will allow us to invest our money in a worthwhile or profitable business.
- (6) The Vegetable Project will help bring about the improvement that is needed in the community.
- (7) The Vegetable Project will give us more power to get what we want from Ottawa.
- (8) The Vegetable Project will make us money.
- (9) The Vegetable Project will become a profit making business in the third year.

Finally, the goals of the Project as seen by Mr. Green, the Manager and Supervisor of the Project, should be examined. (Mr. Green was hired on a three year service contract to manage and supervise the Project. He was responsible to the Indian Agricultural Advisory Committee for technical direction and responsible to the Superintendent of the

Edmonton Indian Agency for administration direction.) He was to try to follow Community Development principles as closely as possible. The Project was to train people in good working habits though some technical training was necessary too. The Project was to supply work for about 40 to 50 people. It was to be a focus around which work could be started to build a better community. In the third year the Vegetable Project was to start showing a profit. Finally, the Vegetable Project was to develop a good crop rotation and management pattern which could be carried on by the Band members in the future.

CHAPTER IV

ORGANIZATION, MANAGEMENT, AND WORKINGS OF THE VEGETABLE PROJECT

Organization

In early 1965 the Indian Affairs Branch advertised in Alberta for an Agricultural Project Manager. His duties were defined as undertaking the management and supervision under direction, of a new row crop project to be initiated in the spring of 1965. In the initial stages the Project was to involve the growing, harvesting, storing, and marketing of various root crops under the general guidance of the Indian Agricultural Project Committee.

In a letter to the National Employment Service the following comments were made:

The philosophy of the Project is that it takes six hours of labor to grow an acre of grain but 160 hours of labor to grow an acre of carrots. We are endeavoring to utilize the resources of our reserves to create employment for our Indian people within their own cultural environment and to develop sound work habits to make them better orientated to seek employment away from the reserve as the young generation grows older.

It is expected that after the first or second year a trust will be formed whereby the trust will manage the lands and the larger trust will take over at least 2,000 acres of land for vegetable farming. The Project Supervisor can develop the Project and eventually have the largest vegetable growing Project in the Province. It is expected that within three years if it is developed fast enough, the Project should warrant a salary of \$10,000 plus commission depending upon the person's ability.

The funds will be unencumbered and placed in a separate trust account which the Project Supervisor can manage through the Secretary and Chief of the Band.

On June 15, 1965, two letters were written to the Project Supervisor. One letter which was the official contract, stated in part:

I am authorized to enter into a contract with you as Manager and Supervisor, under direction of the Indian Agricultural Project Committee.

I understand the duties will include:

1. Supervision of all field operations of potato vegetable and small fruits.
2. Training of Indian labor to operate machinery and other phases of the work.
3. Marketing of all produce on a profitable basis.
4. Keeping of all records for audit and research purposes.

I also understand this contract may be terminated for just cause (e.g. unsatisfactory management of the Project according to the decision of the Advisory Committee).

The second letter of June 15, 1965, states in part:

It is understood that for all technical guidance you will refer to the Chairman of the Advisory Committee. It is further understood that for administrative details regarding handling of finance and rules with the Council you will be guided by the Superintendent of the Edmonton Agency.

In addition to the above letters there were many verbal suggestions and promises from both parties regarding goals, plans, and remuneration for the future.

A growing interest had developed as a result of the success of a trust on a nearby reserve. On November 22, 1965, 75 percent of the Band electors signed a petition asking for a Farm Trust for the Vegetable Project. A Deed of Trust was drawn up similar to another which had passed. With a Council resolution asking that a Trust be set up, the two were sent to Ottawa in early April of 1966. At a meeting in February, 1966, an election by secret ballot had been held which selected five men for the Farm Trust. Two of the men were Band members,

and three were local farmers who were respected by the Band for their interest in the Reserve, and their ability as farmers. Although the Farm Trust had not been approved, it was assumed that it would be very shortly. By March 28, 1966, the Farm Trust Directors were making recommendations for acreages of each crop and deciding on machinery and other farm problems which had to be decided before spring work could be started. Up to the time of writing the Farm Trust has still not been passed, although the Farm Trust Directors still meet.

To understand some of the organizational difficulties of the Vegetable Project, Figure 2 is included. The general organization and managerial hierarchy of the Vegetable Project is noted in this Figure. In March 1966 the Advisory Committee defined the following roles (because it was generally accepted that Ottawa would pass the Farm Trust, the Farm Trust group was included in the definition). First of all, the Band Council was defined as the political body on the Reserve responsible for Reserve services; secondly, the Farm Trust was the body responsible for the management of farming operations; and finally, the Agency was to be the group responsible for liaison between groups.

One must go back to the summer of 1965 to see the beginning of the circular organizational system that evolved for the Vegetable Project. An election for Band Council was held in 1965. In June the Supervisor wrote that he was not happy with the fact that politics were entering into the Vegetable Project operation, for the result of the election had been a completely new Council, including a new Chief. The new Council knew very little about the Vegetable Project and its operation, whereas the Chief and the Council who had been voted out had been the nucleus of the Vegetable Project. Thus there was no one group capable




Figure 2 ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF ENOCH VEGETABLE PROJECT

of carrying on the Project in the manner first intended. Furthermore, one of the new Councillors was the Head Foreman of the Vegetable Project.

It can be seen in Figure 2 that one man (starred) held three positions. The Assistant Manager of the Project also held positions on the Farm Trust and the Band Council. As Assistant Manager his attitudes and duties might tend to conflict with the attitudes and duties of a Councillor and member of the Farm Trust. Thus the Assistant Manager was in a very awkward position. As a member of the Council it was his duty to look after the welfare of the people. If they needed financial assistance, it was his duty to see that they received it. However, as Assistant Manager of the Vegetable Project, he had to try to make the operation as efficient as possible, hiring those who could do the most efficient job, regardless of their needs. The general feeling was that the Vegetable Project should supply work. Thus the usual course he took was to give work to anyone who wanted it. The second problem was even more difficult in some ways. As a member of the Council he was to help direct the Supervisor regarding money matters. Although the contract states that this is to be a duty of the Chief and Band Secretary, it was always accepted as a duty of the Council as a whole. Since he was the Assistant Manager his opinion on matters regarding the Vegetable Project was usually accepted. This, in effect, made him his boss's boss. In many instances the result was the creation of a bad working relationship, for neither the Supervisor nor Assistant Manager-Councillor knew who held the final authority or decision-making power. Also there was a growing resentment toward the Assistant Manager, because he exercised far more power than is usually given his position. Very little restraint could be used against him by anyone without drastic action resulting. Even so, generally there seemed to be little dissatisfaction with the Assistant Manager.

Management

The chronological approach used in this section, outlines some of the managerial situations that arose around the Vegetable Project. On May 17, 1965, the Supervisor of the Vegetable Project began work. This was an unfortunately late date to begin the Project, but most people felt that it was better to start late than to postpone the Project for a year.

Supervisory Factors

In addition to the Supervisor's duties outlined in his contract and subsequent letters, there were several other factors that he had to take into account. For instance, in April, 1965, the Indian Affairs Branch agreed to an incentive bonus of 10 percent of profits, divided on an hourly basis to all working in excess of 200 hours. Moreover, the Supervisor understood that there were about 40 people who wanted to work; therefore, 106 acres of crops would supply them with sufficient work. However, he soon found that there were over 100 people who wished to work. There are two main reasons for this excess of labor. The year 1965 was a very wet year and weeds were a greater problem than in most years; therefore, more people were needed to weed. A great deal of the work was being done by too many people. Jobs normally requiring five people had ten or twelve working on them. Many children were hired. During the fall eight-year-old children were receiving a dollar an hour for picking potatoes.

Another new factor that the Supervisor had to consider after he had begun work was the problem of marketing the vegetables. The Indian Affairs Branch people had been assured that all vegetables grown could be marketed in Edmonton. The Supervisor, starting late, had

no time to check on the markets. Thus without marketing information the following acreages were seeded:

Potatoes	75 acres
Turnips	20 acres
Carrots	3 acres
Onions	3 acres
Cabbage	5 acres

Furthermore, there was no plan for a crop rotation system which is required on any long term vegetable project. Taking all these factors into consideration, the Supervisor increased the acreage to 350 acres. Therefore, because of the late start and increased acreage, some crops were planted abnormally late in 1965.

Budget

The original budget prepared by a member of the Advisory Committee was not sufficient due to the additional acres and excess of labor used. In September, 1965, an additional budget was prepared asking for \$13,500. This new budget was passed, but by December of 1965 more money was requested for the preparation of potatoes for sale. For this another \$15,000 was allocated. Thus questions arose about where the money was going, how the Project was to be operated, and how efficient was the management. However, these questions were swept away in the enthusiasm generated by the Christmas bonus. Though the Edmonton Agency had agreed to 10 percent of the profits based on the hours worked for anyone working over 200 hours, when pressure was brought to bear on the Council and Supervisor, a bonus of 10 percent of wages was paid to all who had worked over 100 hours.

In spite of certain flaws in the Project from the beginning Band members took an active interest in it. On the first day, for example, the present Assistant Manager arrived looking for things that

needed to be done. On finding that a load of fertilizer was coming, he drove around and gathered a crew. This same willingness to do a job is still evident today. Furthermore, despite the problems of the first year a great deal of excitement was aroused about the Project, and the Band members continued to be enthusiastic about it. For example, on a suggestion of the Advisory Committee a weekly newsletter was published and mailed to all Band members during the summer. It proved to be quite successful, in that it kept many of the older people, not working on the Project, up-to-date on Project and general Band news.

The Project in 1966

Acreage

During the winter months Band members started planning for the next year. In December of 1965 a resolution was passed by the Band Council to the effect that "just potatoes be grown as that is all that makes money." Acreage was not stated. In spite of earlier recommendations for consolidation and limited acreages the Advisory Committee made the following compromise recommendation for 1966:

Early Potatoes	50 acres
Netted Gems	200 acres
Carrots	10 acres
Turnip	10 acres
Cabbage	10 acres
Corn	5 acres
Onions	3 acres
Raspberries	3 acres
Saskatoons	1 acre
	282 acres

and the Trust Directors made these acreage recommendations for 1966:

Early Potatoes	50 acres
Netted Gems	100 acres
Carrots	50 acres
Turnips	20 acres
Onions	3 acres

Cabbage	2 acres
Corn	15 acres
Beans, etc.	10 acres
<hr/>	
	250 acres

Again all acreage recommendations left out summerfallow.

By March 1966 the members of the Co-op Farm, started in 1965, had decided to quit. So on the first day of April the Vegetable Project was given the grain and hay equipment belonging to the Co-op Farm and worth about \$18,000.00. In addition, three sections of land set aside for the Farm Trust were to be figured into the operation and an additional one-half section was to be taken over from the Co-op Farm. Thus by the first of May the acreages had grown for the above reasons to:

Oats	245.0 acres
Barley	270.0 acres
Turnips	8.4 acres
Onions	5.0 acres
Carrots	8.3 acres
Potato	238.3 acres
Cabbage	14.6 acres
Raspberries	4.4 acres
Beans	1.0 acres
Corn	12.0 acres
Summerfallow	671.0 acres
<hr/>	
Total	1,533.0 acres

Concerning what to plant and how much, the Supervisor was in a seriously confused situation. His contract stated that he was responsible to the Advisory Committee and must take their advice. He expected that the Trust would be passed in the near future. He also expected to be responsible to the Farm Trust for production and have their guidance in the future. And in the spring of 1966 the Band Council, which controls the money for production, wanted to plant only potatoes.

Reports

A member of the Advisory Committee wrote a report near the end of January 1966 summarizing the activities of the first eight months of the Vegetable Project. The report is summed up as follows;

The undertaking now appears to be a Project of dual nature:

The first and most important aspect is one of attempting to inculcate habits of punctuality, responsibility, cooperation, sobriety, and an appreciation of industry and it's rewards in the Indian workers.

The second aspect is dependent to a considerable degree on the gradual attainment of the first and is the management of the Project in such a way as to make it economically successful as soon as possible.

It appears to me that in the light of the large measure of education and training in the social attitudes, which must be acquired by the Indians, that the Vegetable Project is as much an educational undertaking as it is a business.

The two objectives in the Project (a) training and employing as many workers as possible and (b) intent to realize a profit may not be compatible. These aspects are policy considerations which will have important economic consequences.

Another report was forthcoming in April in which the same Advisory Committee member with the help of the Supervisor and Assistant Manager made a list of 29 items they felt had been influenced by the Vegetable Project. The report began: "The following items are comments of a Council member and the Project Supervisor on Social and Educational improvements achieved in the operation of the Vegetable Project in 1965." Among the items listed were: (a) continuing to work a full day, (b) getting a job done, (c) working with each other, (d) understanding objectives, (e) realizing the need for team work. The list ended with this statement: "The items above were largely lacking before the Project got underway."

However, this report was not sent to Ottawa. The Band Council passed a resolution that the letter not be sent anywhere. On at least two other

occasions non-Band members tried to send the letter to Ottawa but were turned down by the Band Council.

Personnel

The job of Foreman evolved as one of the most important in the Vegetable Project. Heavy losses were often caused when the Foreman was off the job. For example, in 1966, 15 acres of potatoes were harrowed with the wrong type of harrow, and the area done was a complete loss. It was essential that the Foreman be on the job all the time because of the rapid turnover of workers. In 1965, 25.4 percent of the workers were new on the job each day. In 1966, 18.2 percent of the workers were new on the job each day. (To calculate this, it was assumed that if a person was off the job for three or more working days, he was new on the job.) The following comments sum up the feeling of many of the workers about their work situation.

This is the best job I've ever been on, no one always on your neck when you slow down; in fact, no one ever says anything. I can work for a couple of days then leave, come in a week or so and everything is fine. I can work whenever I want.

The attitude of the Foreman was expressed in the following statement: "What are we supposed to be doing here, making money or supplying work; we can't do both." Since no one was in a position to give a definite answer and back it up, the Foreman continued to allow more people to work than were needed. A frequent criticism of the Foreman was that he never told or showed anyone exactly how a job was to be done. The following comment was typical: "The Foreman drives us out, points to a field, says you can start here, and drives off. We don't see anyone until five when someone picks us up."

Many people in the fields felt that the Foreman and Assistant Manager were taking advantage of their position. One particularly hot afternoon about 25 people hoeing in the field saw the Assistant Manager and the three top foremen playing horseshoes in the shade of the root cellar. All the men playing horseshoes had worked at least 12 hours that day; and while playing horseshoes, they were discussing the Vegetable Project. At least three major decisions were made regarding it during the game. The attitude grew throughout the summer that "the foreman are not working; why should we?" When the Vegetable Project was discussed with members of the Band working off the Reserve, all expressed favorable attitudes toward it, but most of them had one criticism here stated emphatically by one person:

Do you know anything about these people [referring to band members in charge of the Project]. Some of them have never done a day's work in their lives, and now all of a sudden they are important. The guys leading this have never been successful at anything in their lives but drinking and raising children.

Bookkeeping

During the 1965 season the Supervisor's wife kept the books, working on an hourly basis. In 1966 the coding for the I.B.M. data processing of records was done by Band members. In 1965 it was impossible for anyone to check on any aspect of the Vegetable Project, because the books were in Edmonton at the accounting firm. In 1966, Project data were in unreliable I.B.M. Data Processing records and equally inaccessible. This inaccessibility of books presented a serious problem in the summer of 1966 for many workers. The auditor had most, if not all of the books for 1965 from the second week in May 1966 until January 2, 1967. During the summer the auditor revised the books using an I.B.M. computer.

There were many coding mistakes and other errors up to the time of writing, and no figure in the monthly reports is considered reliable unless it is checked against original bills or receipts. Presently, several Band members are learning to code for the I.B.M. Data Processing records and hopefully will be quite efficient in a few months.

Trucks and Transportation

Another continuing problem was the lack of men with drivers licenses. Often no one with a license was available to drive. Highway Number 60 runs the entire width of the Reserve and is the only road that can be used to get to many fields. Therefore, both the Supervisor and the Assistant Manager often spent time doing small jobs that involved driving, time which could have been used much more productively.

During the 1966 crop season the Vegetable Project had four tractors and two trucks--two of the tractors had 50 horsepower gas engines; the other two tractors had diesel engines of about 90 horsepower. The two trucks, a one-half ton and a three and one-half ton had gasoline engines. The approximate gas consumption is given below:

Gas	10,718 gallons,
Diesel Fuel	8,332 gallons.

Most Band members accepted the fact that a lot of gas was stolen. Band members stated, "if it was my gas, I'd sure catch them." A great deal of mileage was recorded for the half-ton truck due to the heavy use of the truck for personal business. The truck was being used to such an extent that the Band Council finally passed a resolution giving authority for the trucks to the Supervisor and stating that they were only to be used at his discretion.

Harvest

By harvest the Vegetable Project was in a very disorganized state of affairs. Cabbages which had been ordered were not picked because the workers complained about getting wet and cold. However, at the same time other workers rode the potato harvester during 20 m.p.h. winds, it soon became apparent that the potatoes would not be harvested unless outside help was solicited. A member of the Farm Trust harvested 115 acres of potatoes for less than ⁴⁴⁵ the actual cost. The grain harvest was going so slowly that after their own work was done several farmers came to assist in harvesting the grain. About one acre of carrots were left on the ground, and only a few of the turnips were harvested. Money was running out quickly, but still no notification about the Farm Trust was forthcoming. When officials from Ottawa were asked why the Trust had not been approved, they seemed to be surprised that it had not been approved. They also said that as soon as they got back to Ottawa they would find out why it had not been approved. At the time of writing however, Band Council had still heard nothing officially about the Farm Trust.

With the pressure of no money, slow harvesting operations, and unfulfilled promises from Ottawa, the Supervisor began to write abusive letters to anyone who might be able to accomplish something if goaded enough. Complaints and adverse opinions were legion. A man working on the Project stated, "this Vegetable Project will go on as long as there is money in Ottawa. The day the money goes, that is the end of the Project." Another Vegetable Project worker stated that the Project will continue "until we can find some better way to get our money from Ottawa." Another person complaining about the Project asked, "if you had

money in the bank, and when you wanted to get some out, the banker told you that you had to hoe potatoes for one hour to get one dollar, would you be very happy?" Thus among some Band members there was little optimism concerning the future or the success of the Vegetable Project due to the many organizational and managerial problems encountered.

CHAPTER V

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE VEGETABLE PROJECT

In any farming operation it is important to know where the money is going and what the returns are on the money spent. In this Chapter the author hopes to show where the money went and how the expenses of the Project compare with the expenses of the farmers in adjacent areas. Throughout this Chapter comparisons will be made, using portions of a study done by E.E.R. King.¹ In King's study, potato farms in the Edmonton area were divided into three groups according to the number of acres of potatoes they grew. The second size category in King's study, 101-150 acres, was used as a comparison with the 1965 crop on the Reserve and the third size category of 151-350 acres was used in the 1966 crop analysis.

Analysis for the two crop years has not been done on a twelve month basis. All tables and figures for 1965 include data from May 1st, 1965 to March 31st, 1966. All analysis shown for 1966 is from data for the period April 1st to November 30th. Most of the 1966 crop was still to be sold which would, in fact, increase costs, particularly labor for that crop year. In this Chapter labor is analyzed separately because it appears so much higher than for other comparable operations.

¹E.E.R. King, "Capital Investments, Production Costs, and Yields of Commercial Potato Production in Alberta," (Edmonton: Economics Branch, Canada Department of Agriculture, 1966).

Land Use

Table 4 shows the land use of potato farmers around Edmonton as compared to that of the Vegetable Project. (Note that in 1966 size of the Vegetable Project moved to a different category in King's study.) There was initially a large acreage which had to be fallowed, due to the weed infestation, this creating an extra expense for the Project. In Table 4 yield per acre comparisons cannot be given too much weight because 1962 was not a good year for potato growing, with yields being somewhat below the long time average. On the other hand 1965 and 1966 were very good years.

Comparison With Other Potato Farms

To give a general picture of how the Vegetable Project compared with other potato farms in the Edmonton area, Table 5 has been included. Land has been valued at \$100 per acre in both cases, for purposes of comparison. Because the Vegetable Project took over land which had been in grain, a great deal more land had to be summerfallowed than would be the practice after the Vegetable Project initiates a regular crop rotation. It is quite possible that summerfallow will be excluded from the crop rotation once the weed problem is brought under control. Table 5 shows the capital cost of the only building constructed for the Vegetable Project, a root cellar. In the beginning of the Project plans were made to grow many vegetables requiring excellent storage conditions. The root cellar presently used only for potatoes cost \$72,940.00, while farmers having an equal acreage of potatoes have only \$13,719 invested in potato storage.¹ During the summer of 1966 when

¹ Ibid., p. 8

Table 4
LAND USE AND GENERAL FARM ORGANIZATION

Item	King 101-150 Acres	1965 Project	King 151-350 Acres	1966 Project
Total farm acreage	414	350	1,565	1,533
owned	194	350	320	1,533
rented	220	-	1,245	-
Total crop acreage	287	350	995	1,478
potatoes	125	96	280	238
grain and oilseed	124	-	530	515
summerfallow	37	211	185	671
vegetables except potatoes	1	43	0	54
Total hay, waste, pasture	127	-	570	55
Farmstead	-	-	-	-
Livestock numbers	-	-	-	-
horses	.2	-	-	-
cattle	9.2	-	16.0	-
swine	2.4	-	-	-
sheep	-	-	-	-
poultry	2,020	-	-	-
<u>Potato Enterprise</u>				
Total acreage	125	96	280	238
owned	79	96	95	238
rented	46	-	185	-
Yield per acre tons	6.04	7.5	6.69	3.1
Potato enterprise share of operators gross income	60%	99%	60%	58%

Source: Ibid., Table 1, p. 5.

Table 5
SUMMARY OF AVERAGE CAPITAL REQUIREMENT PER POTATO FARM

Item	King 101-150 Acres	1965	King 151-350 Acres	Percent of Total		
				1966	1965	1966
(in dollars)						
Equipment used for potatoes	18,259	28,572	39,947	43,674	34	21
Buildings for potatoes	3,098	61,819	18,776	76,499	6	45
Land	28,720	34,900	99,500	154,500	54	25
Average working capital	3,085	13,220	8,108	22,584	6	9
Total	53,162	138,511	163,331	297,257	100	100

Source: Ibid., Table 2, p. 6.

the root cellar was to be finished, there was considerable discussion about putting in refrigeration and a humidifier unit. Because labor had taken so much more of the budget than had been estimated, it was felt by most that the Band could not afford the expense. Furthermore, there was a growing feeling among many of the Band members that vegetables, other than potatoes, did not pay and that no more money should be spent on storage facilities for them. Thus the Vegetable Project now has very good, but overly expensive, potato storage facilities which at the same time is an inadequate vegetable storage building. It should, therefore, be noted that the tremendous difference in actual cost of buildings for potato storage distorts the rest of the percentage comparisions in Table 5.

Investment in Equipment

Table 6 supplies information on capital investment in equipment for 1965 and 1966. Because King's study was done in 1962, one can assume that many of the input costs have increased since then. However, it is not the purpose of this study to make direct comparisons between prices paid in King's study and those paid for Band equipment but rather to show relative expenditures for various inputs.

There are several factors to keep in mind while studying Table 6. First of all, the Project was initiated in 1965; therefore, all equipment had to be purchased at that time. The farmers in King's study had acquired their machinery over a period of years; thus many had some older machinery in operation which tended to lower the stated capital investment in equipment. In one year (1965 to 1966) the Vegetable Project increased its acreage by 438 percent. A grain crop was added in 1966, a fact which further complicates the comparison. More

Table 6
AVERAGE CURRENT VALUE OF CAPITAL INVESTMENT IN EQUIPMENT

Item	King 100-150 Acres	1965	King 151-350 Acres	1966 100-150 Acres	Percent of Total		
					King 100-150 Acres	1965	King 151-350 Acres
(in dollars)							
Tractors	3,210	10,445.60	11,625	19,112.76	16	36	25
Trucks	3,680	-	4,800	2,450.00	18	-	10
Cars	1,740	-	1,775	-	9	-	4
Sprinklers	1,300	-	-	-	6	-	-
Pre-harvest equipment	2,057	3,438.65	8,665	5,692.19	10	12	18
Potato harvest equipment	4,142	7,034.35	5,990	9,130.91	20	25	13
Post harvest potato equipment	2,130	7,653.83	4,092	6,888.45	11	27	9
Present value of equipment used for potato enterprise	18,259	28,572.43	36,947	43,274.31	90	100	79
Grain hay L.S. equipment	2,050	-	10,225	14,545.75	10	-	21
Present value of all equipment	20,309	28,572.43	47,172	57,820.06	100	100	100

Source: Ibid., p. 6.

machinery was purchased, and some was taken over from the Co-op farm to service the larger acreage. Considering the rapid growth of the Vegetable Project, the amount and cost of machinery seems to be about the same as that of the local potato farmers.

Most farms build up their equipment over time as they can afford to purchase additional machinery. Gradual acquisition of machinery is advantageous for the larger farmer who must buy new equipment because no second hand equipment is available of the necessary size. Out of the \$21,139 for 1966, the Vegetable Project took over \$17,300 worth of equipment, only one year old and in very good condition, for the Co-op farm. The large tractor, for example, had only 500 hours of use. This machinery is therefore, as good as new, and if considered on that basis, there is only \$3,839.00 or 6 percent of used equipment in potato production on the Project instead of the 34 percent listed in Table 7.

Table 7

AVERAGE EXPENDITURE, PER POTATO FARM,
FOR ADDITION TO EQUIPMENT USED IN POTATO PRODUCTION

Item	King 151-350	1966
(in dollars)		
New equipment	45,176	40,662
Used equipment	8,169	21,139
Percent of total spent		
new	85%	66%
used	15%	34%

Source: Ibid., Table 3, p. 8.

Labor Costs 1965

Labor constituted one of the highest expenditures in the cost analysis. Table 8A gives a breakdown of the labor costs for each crop in 1965. The 1965 costs run from May 1965 to March 31, 1966. In 1965 very few records were kept of the work done on a daily basis. As a result, a fine breakdown in Table 8A is impossible. A record was kept of the hours a person worked each week. Using the hourly rate (which varied according to the job), the Foreman's memory, the field notes, and the Supervisor's diary and notes, an appraisal was made to determine what each person was doing each day. The costs of bookkeeping are included in management labor costs. The 1965 labor costs included the costs incurred in 1966 for processing and selling the 1965 crop.

Operating Costs 1965

Table 8B shows the operating costs in 1965. Some of the vegetable seed purchased in 1965 was carried over to 1966 so this cost is actually less than shown in the Project books for 1965. Unfortunately, fuel and lubricant bills were, and still are, in a state of confusion. Because this is a government backed Project, fuel is purchased tax free. At first the records had to go through the Indian Affairs Branch. Bills for gas purchased in January 1966 were still not available in December 1966 after the study had been completed. Therefore, fuel and lubricant costs are based on fuel delivered, not on bills received. During the winter and early spring, nearly all the tools were stolen so all tools have been written off as an expense for the year purchased. Utility expenses were high during 1965 due to the construction of the root cellar. Work was often carried on into the night in an attempt to finish before winter. The interest charge on working capital has been appraised at

Table 8A

LABOR COST FOR 1965

Item	Potato	Carrot	Corn	Turnip	Summer-fallow	Total
(in dollars)						
Handwork and						
seeding	11,420.51	1,782.47	177.84	3,257.77	-	16,638.59
grading	7,605.08	-	-	-	-	7,605.08
harvest	4,559.55	-	-	1,774.80	-	6,334.35
tractor	1,440.00	170.00	578.00	714.00	310.90	3,212.90
Direct Production						
productive labor	25,025.14	1,952.47	755.84	5,746.57	310.90	33,790.92
Management	4,589.58	380.53	145.92	1,113.27	60.38	6,289.68
Car Allowance	338.42	6.93	57.55	71.10	30.00	504.00
Total Labor Cost						
	29,953.14	2,339.93	959.31	6,930.94	401.28	40,584.60

Table 8B

OPERATING COST FOR 1965
(Exclusive of Labor)

Item	Potato	Carrot	Corn	Turnip	Summerfallow	Total
(in dollars)						
Seed	6,375.00	11.50	70.75	10.00	-	6,467.25
Fuel & lubricants	712.13	35.00	85.00	200.00	-	1,207.13
Fertilizer	2,100.16	122.66	376.45	462.63	-	3,061.90
Spray	30.55	-	-	-	-	30.55
Tools	393.55	5.87	66.38	82.20	15.00	563.00
Repairs	484.67	25.24	85.82	106.02	307.95	1,009.70
Bank charges	123.03	12.63	4.68	18.47	2.97	161.78
Utilities	500.00	25.00	-	60.00	5.50	590.50
Office Supplies	479.32	37.80	14.58	110.87	5.83	648.40
Selling expenses	150.38	-	-	-	-	150.38
Acreage rental	550.00	-	-	-	-	550.00
Rental & custom work	906.83	-	-	-	-	906.83
Potato sacks	1,280.00	-	-	-	-	1,280.00
Insurance: Potato	21.00	-	-	-	-	21.00
machinery	30.59	.51	1.75	2.17	6.32	41.34
liability	36.80	2.88	1.09	8.50	.44	49.71
root cellar	550.00	50.00	-	87.75	-	687.75
Doubtful account	1,054.44	-	-	-	-	1,054.44
Miscellaneous	1,022.10	78.40	16.83	138.64	248.73	1,504.70
Workman compensation	1,210.88	95.58	36.89	280.99	15.08	1,639.42
Interest on working capital	1,231.12	71.08	42.99	212.48	43.35	1,601.02
Total operating cost	19,242.55	574.15	803.21	1,780.72	1,376.17	23,776.80

five percent per annum. This is the rate of interest that the Indian Affairs Branch pays the Band for Band funds in trust. The acreage rental had to be paid to Band members who had Certificates of Possession. In Table 8C which shows the fixed costs for 1965, interest was also charged at 5 percent per annum.

Labor and Operating Costs 1966

Tables 9A, 9B, and 9C give similar information for 1966. For example, Table 9A gives the labor costs for each crop in 1966 from April the first to November 30, and Table 9B shows operating costs for 1966.

Before the start of the 1966 season a time clock was purchased. Also each worker was asked to record what he did each day. Occasionally the Supervisor or Foreman would enforce this new rule, but usually it was left up to the individual. There was a very good response, and it was relatively easy to assign labor costs to the crop (except for a few individuals who did not specify adequately). This problem was solved by working with the Foreman on the assignment of costs. The supervision, janitorial, office, and car allowances have all been divided on the basis of direct productive labor spent per crop. The row indicating tractor labor costs is not all inclusive because there are some tractor hours used in broadcasting fertilizer, seeding, cultivating, spraying, harvesting, and summerfallowing. It was felt that this further classification of costs would give a more complete accounting of expenditures.

The amount shown for seed preparation included expenses incurred before April 1. The very high cost of seed preparation for potatoes resulted from the large number of people working in the root cellar in the early spring and the fact that a great many of the potatoes were partially rotten.

Table 8C

FIXED COSTS FOR 1965

Item	Potato	Carrot	Corn	Turnip	Summer-fallow	Total
(in dollars)						
Depreciation						
root cellar	1,873.88	110.26	-	220.46	-	2,204.60
water system	104.29	6.14	-	12.27	-	122.70
machinery	1,997.12	38.50	130.92	161.72	469.76	2,798.02
office equipment	5.96	.46	.17	1.37	.07	8.03
Interest						
root cellar	2,810.86	165.34	-	330.69	-	3,306.89
water system	156.45	9.20	-	18.40	-	184.05
machinery	1,119.29	21.48	73.24	90.49	263.79	1,568.29
office equipment	12.18	.95	.36	2.81	.14	16.44
Total fixed cost	8,080.03	352.33	204.69	838.21	733.76	10,209.02

Table 9A

LABOR COST IN 1966

Item	Summerfallow	Oats	Barley	Turnips	Onions	Carrots	Potato
(in dollars)							
Broadcasting							
fertilizer	-	35.10	16.20	3.80	3.20	4.10	58.40
Preparing seed	-	156.80	102.60	-	-	-	4,191.70
Seeding	-	135.80	165.00	18.40	5.50	16.60	1,010.35
Hoeing	-	-	-	278.35	187.48	336.96	5,217.32
Cultivating	-	-	-	-	19.51	15.84	441.65
Spraying	6.92	22.40	24.75	2.20	1.85	2.20	31.78
Tractor	85.60	309.50	285.90	17.90	15.00	16.40	280.05
Swathing	-	201.65	186.10	-	-	-	-
Harvest	-	805.00	911.10	208.50	-	2,460.78	3,396.25
Sacking & grading	-	156.40	102.20	-	-	-	4,191.24
Selling	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Summerfallow	548.90	-	-	-	-	-	-
Maintenance	421.64	308.34	339.91	10.57	6.31	10.44	599.17
Night watchman	11.72	8.57	9.45	.21	.17	.29	18.34
Root cellar bins							
Direct productive labor	1,074.78	2,184.56	2,143.21	561.32	235.17	2,879.57	19,771.39
Supervision	194.00	474.44	521.59	102.84	46.83	537.23	3,199.68
Office	53.74	131.79	144.88	28.57	13.01	149.23	888.79
Janitor	13.97	34.26	37.67	7.43	3.38	38.80	231.09
Car allowance	6.23	15.28	16.81	3.31	1.51	17.31	103.10
Overhead labor	73.94	181.33	199.36	39.31	17.90	205.34	1,222.98
Total labor cost	1,342.72	2,840.33	2,864.16	703.47	299.90	3,622.14	24,193.96

Table 9A (continued)

LABOR COST IN 1966

Item	Hay	Cabbage	Raspberries	Beans	Corn	Total
(in dollars)						
Broadcasting				.50	11.00	140.00
fertilizer	-	5.50	2.20		-	4,451.10
Preparing seed	-	-	-			2,172.22
Seeding	-	53.40	751.17	1.00	15.00	9,347.62
Hoeing	-	1,122.47	2,060.00	56.14	88.90	553.30
Cultivating	-	36.50	-	3.00	13.20	
Spraying	-	3.30	-	.85	1.10	97.35
Tractor	94.40	18.80	8.80	4.40	13.00	1,148.95
Swathing	-	-	-		-	387.75
Harvest	740.30	1,890.15	-	29.16	-	10,486.24
Sacking & grading	-	-	-			4,449.84
Selling	5.00	48.90	-	-		142.50
Summerfallow	-	-	-			548.90
Maintenance	69.10	18.37	5.54	1.08	14.97	1,805.26
Night watchman	1.92	.51	.15	.03	.42	51.86
Root cellar bins	-	-	-		-	256.45
Direct productive						
labor	910.72	3,197.10	2,827.86	96.16	157.59	36,039.34
Supervision	163.93	646.16	509.03	23.43	32.04	6,451.20
Office	45.54	179.49	141.39	6.51	8.90	1,791.84
Janitor	11.84	46.67	36.76	1.69	2.31	465.87
Car allowance	5.28	20.82	16.40	.75	1.03	207.83
Overhead labor	62.66	246.98	194.55	8.95	12.24	2,465.54
Total labor cost	1,137.31	4,090.24	3,531.44	128.54	201.87	44,956.08

Table 9B

OPERATING COSTS - 1966
(Excluding labor)

Item	Summerfallow	Oats	Barley	Turnips	Onions	Carrots
(in dollars)						
Seed	-	608.00	857.10	10.00	25.00	105.00
Purple gas	3.84	616.91	724.81	24.42	14.68	25.86
Diesel fuel	367.06	257.61	165.39	10.35	8.68	9.49
Grease & oil	46.62	109.93	111.90	4.37	2.94	4.44
Fertilizer	-	2,015.40	2,059.80	194.04	116.00	191.05
Spray	6.04	61.25	67.50	6.90	4.31	5.30
Tools	8.95	84.30	92.91	2.89	1.72	2.86
Truck Repairs	34.84	328.30	361.80	11.26	6.70	11.12
General Repairs	88.40	833.00	918.00	28.56	17.00	28.22
Accounting	15.00	36.72	40.32	7.89	3.54	41.64
Bank charges	6.11	13.51	14.76	3.72	2.50	2.42
Utilities	19.07	179.73	198.07	6.16	3.67	6.09
Office Supplies	15.44	37.85	41.64	8.21	3.74	42.86
Advertising	-	-	-	.34	-	3.70
Crop share	-	1,721.56	2,133.74	-	-	-
Acreage rental	1,001.10	-	-	-	-	33.00
Rental & custom work	-	578.52	592.48	3.98	1.20	260.00
First aid	.60	1.47	1.62	.32	.14	1.67
Insurance root cellar	-	-	-	1.11	-	6.27
Machines	8.92	8.40	8.76	1.53	.46	1.51
Liability	3.25	7.96	8.76	1.73	.79	9.02
Miscellaneous	21.23	51.97	57.13	11.26	5.13	588.84
Workman Comp.	62.72	153.75	169.03	33.33	15.17	174.10
Sacks	-	-	-	-	-	-
Interest on working capital	45.78	155.84	170.81	16.14	7.99	69.70
Total operating cost	1,755.07	7,861.98	8,796.33	388.51	241.36	1,094.16

Table 9B (continued)

Item	Potato	Hay	Cabbage	Raspberries	Beans	Corn	Total
(in dollars)							
Seed	1,852.41	-	12.00	-	35.00	35.40	3,539.91
Purple gas	840.08	32.26	54.90	1.22	2.42	22.41	2,363.81
Diesel fuel	344.50	43.39	10.41	5.09	2.55	4.52	1,232.04
Grease & oil	148.90	9.51	8.21	.79	.62	3.76	451.99
Fertilizer	4,347.75	-	276.42	29.04	25.35	223.20	9,478.05
Spray	205.68	-	12.60	-	.86	10.36	380.80
Tools	82.00	18.92	5.02	1.51	.34	4.13	305.55
Truck repairs	319.32	73.70	19.56	5.90	1.34	16.08	1,189.92
General repairs	810.22	187.00	49.64	14.96	3.40	40.80	3,019.20
Accounting	248.52	12.64	50.11	39.45	1.74	2.43	500.00
Bank charges	85.56	5.32	18.03	14.42	1.62	.95	68.92
Utilities	174.82	40.35	10.71	3.23	.73	8.80	651.43
Office supplies	255.28	13.08	51.55	40.61	1.87	2.56	514.69
Advertising	95.80	-	10.36	-	-	-	110.26
Crop share	-	150.00	-	-	-	-	4,005.30
Acreage rental	1,210.00	-	-	-	-	-	2,244.10
Rental & custom							
work	6,082.50	-	14.00	-	.93	9.89	7,543.50
First aid	9.95	.51	2.01	1.58	.07	.10	20.10
Insurance root cellar	769.71	-	36.91	-	1.00	-	815.00
Machines	21.70	3.51	2.65	.41	.19	1.11	59.15
Liability	53.72	2.75	10.85	8.55	.40	.57	108.35
Miscellaneous	830.30	201.30	70.78	55.75	2.58	3.74	1,370.01
Workman Comp.	1,036.92	53.12	209.40	164.96	7.59	10.38	2,090.47
Sacks	1,280.00	-	-	-	-	-	1,280.00
Interest on working							
capital	597.42	29.77	75.40	58.78	3.29	9.09	1,240.01
Total operating	21,703.06	877.13	1,011.52	446.25	93.89	413.28	44,682.54

Table 9C

FIXED COSTS 1966

Item	Summerfallow	Oats	Barley	Turnips	Onions	Carrots
(in dollars)						
Depreciation						
Root Cellar	—	—	—	—	—	21.06
Water System	—	—	—	—	—	.69
Machinery	707.70	666.84	695.20	121.24	36.63	119.69
Office Equipment	.64	1.57	1.73	.34	.15	1.78
Interest						
Root Cellar	—	—	—	—	—	21.06
Water System	—	—	—	—	—	.69
Machinery	267.62	252.16	262.89	45.85	13.85	45.26
Office Equipment	.32	.78	.87	.17	.08	.89
Trustee's Fees	16.24	39.82	43.78	8.63	3.93	45.09
Total Fixed Cost	992.52	961.17	1,004.47	183.47	54.64	256.21

Table 9C (continued)

FIXED COSTS 1966

Item	Potato	Hay	Cabbage	Raspberries	Beans	Corn	Total
(in dollars)							
Depreciation							
Root Cellar	2,051.57	--	122.85	--	.17	--	2,199.16
Water System	114.84	--	2.85	--	--	--	118.49
Machinery	1,720.19	278.11	210.53	32.23	14.42	87.90	4,690.68
Office Equipment	10.59	.54	2.14	1.68	.08	.12	21.36
Interest							
Root Cellar	2,051.51	--	122.85	--	.17	--	2,199.16
Water System	114.84	--	2.85	--	--	--	118.49
Machinery	650.53	105.17	79.61	12.19	5.45	33.24	1,773.82
Office Equipment	5.29	.27	1.07	.84	.04	.06	10.68
Trustee's Fees	268.60	13.76	54.24	42.73	1.96	2.69	541.47
Total Fixed Cost	6,987.96	397.85	598.99	89.67	22.29	124.01	11,673.25

In Table 9B which lists operating costs for 1966, the cost of purple gas is slightly inflated because the Band road grader used gas bought for the Vegetable Project. However, this amount is insignificant when compared to the amount stolen. No change has been made to allow for the amount used by the grader. Again in 1966 acreage rental and crop share expenses were necessary because the Vegetable Project used land on which Band members have Certificates of Possession. Also the Band Council decided in some cases that the person living on the land should have a share of the crop. In 1966 a Band member was paid \$11 per acre for all his land on which vegetables or potatoes were grown. On grain land they received one third of the crop, and on land which was summerfallowed, \$3.00 per acre was paid against next years crop. Included under hay expenses is the cost of baling some straw, an estimated 9,800 bales. Some of these bales were stolen from the field. The bales of straw that were sold are included under hay income. The interest on working capital is again charged at five percent. Table 9C shows the fixed costs for 1966. Here the interest on fixed capital is also charged at five percent. The Trustees fee's are included under fixed costs because they are to be a permanent part of the Vegetable Project.

Costs Per Acre and Per Ton

Table 10 gives a comparison of the average cost per acre of producing potatoes for the Vegetable Project and the surrounding farmers. This table shows the tremendous decrease in cost per acre which took place in one year. The single biggest contributor to this decrease in cost was labor expenses which dropped from \$264.21 to \$71.78 per acre. This is still about \$30.00 per acre more than the labor costs for the surrounding farmers. Another important cut in costs resulted

Table 10
AVERAGE COST PER ACRE OF PRODUCING POTATOES

Item	King 101-150 Acres	1965	King 151-350 Acres	1966
(in dollars)				
Variable costs per acre				
Fuel & lubricant	4.82	7.42	3.50	5.60
Annual repairs	7.94	5.05	8.44	4.74
License & Insurance	0.92	0.70	1.02	0.32
Building repair & Insurance	0.95	5.95	1.86	3.32
Custom work	0.47	9.45	1.33	25.52
Hired labor	23.71	264.21	41.03	71.78
Seed	23.40	66.41	22.15	7.77
Fertilizer	7.22	21.88	8.88	18.24
Spray	1.03	0.32	0.83	0.86
Containers	9.05	13.33	17.16	5.38
Power & telephone	1.37	5.21	1.77	0.73
Other	0.46	46.18	0.57	12.21
Interest on working capital	1.73	12.82	2.03	2.51
Total variable cost	83.07	458.93	110.57	158.98
Fixed cost per acre				
Depreciation Equipment	17.42	20.86	16.73	7.26
Buildings	1.40	20.61	2.70	9.09
Interest on investment				
Equipment	5.79	11.79	5.60	7.26
Buildings	0.68	30.91	3.29	9.09
Owned land	3.16	2.00	1.70	5.00
Land tax and rent	8.87	5.73	6.48	5.08
Total fixed cost	37.32	91.90	36.50	42.78
Total variable cost	83.07	458.93	110.57	158.99
Total cost per acre	120.39	550.83	147.07	201.76
(Excluding return to operator labor and management which for the Project was considered the management staff)				

from the fact that in the second year the Vegetable Project was able to use its own seed. Fixed costs were reduced to half their previous amount due to the increase in acreage. Although there has been a great decrease in cost per acre, costs must be pushed lower still if the Vegetable Project is to succeed. In comparison with the local potato farmers the Vegetable Project still spends over \$50.00 an acre more in potato production.

In Table 11 the average cost per acre per farm of producing potatoes on a percentage basis is given. The single most striking feature about this table is that in 1965, 48 percent of the total cost of producing an acre of potatoes went to labor. This is nearly 250 percent higher than for the local potato farmers of equal size. The tremendous difference in labor distorts the whole table for that year. By 1966 the difference in labor used between farmers and Vegetable Project was only 75 percent. Fuel and lubricant costs per acre went up 115 percent because the trucks were driven for private use and a large quantity of gas and oil was stolen in 1966.

The average cost per ton of producing potatoes is shown in Table 12. The average yield in King's study was 6.2 tons per acre. In 1965 the Vegetable Project averaged 7.5 tons per acre. In 1966 the Project averaged only 3.1 tons per acre. Despite this very low yield the Vegetable Project decreased their cost per ton by nearly \$7.00. If the yield had been normal, about 6.2 tons per acre, the Vegetable Project would have lowered costs to about \$33.00 per ton. Had this yield been obtained, however, storage space would have been inadequate.

Table 11

AVERAGE COST PER ACRE OF PRODUCING POTATOES
ON A PERCENTAGE BASIS

Item	King 101-150 Acres	1965	King 151-350 Acres	1966
Variable costs per acre				
Fuel & lubricant	4.0	1.3	2.4	2.8
Annual repairs	6.6	0.9	5.7	2.4
License & Insurance	0.7	0.1	0.7	0.2
Building repair &				
Insurance	0.7	1.1	1.3	1.6
Custom work	0.4	1.7	0.9	12.6
Hired labor	19.7	48.0	27.9	35.6
Seed	19.4	12.1	15.1	3.8
Fertilizer	6.3	4.0	6.0	9.0
Spray	0.8	0.1	0.6	0.4
Containers	7.5	2.4	11.7	2.7
Power & telephone	1.1	0.9	1.2	0.4
Other	0.4	8.4	0.4	6.1
Interest on working capital	1.4	2.3	1.3	1.2
Total variable cost	69.0	83.3	75.2	78.8
Fixed cost per acre				
Depreciation				
Equipment	14.5	3.8	11.4	3.6
Buildings	1.2	3.7	1.8	4.5
Interest on Investment				
Equipment	4.8	2.1	3.8	3.6
Buildings	0.6	5.7	2.2	4.5
Owned land	2.6	0.4	1.2	2.5
Land tax & rent	7.3	1.0	4.4	2.5
Total fixed cost	31.0	16.7	24.8	21.2
Total variable cost	69.0	83.3	75.2	78.8
Total cost per acre	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table 12

AVERAGE COST PER TON OF PRODUCING POTATOES

Item	King 101-150 Acres	1965	King 151-350 Acres	1966
(in dollars)				
Variable costs per ton				
Fuel & lubricant	0.80	0.98	0.52	1.83
Annual repairs	1.31	0.67	1.26	1.55
License & Insurance	0.15	0.09	0.15	0.10
Building repair & Insurance	0.16	0.79	0.28	1.05
Custom work	0.08	1.25	0.20	8.33
Hired labor	3.92	34.98	6.13	23.43
Seed	3.87	8.79	3.31	2.54
Fertilizer	1.20	2.90	1.33	5.95
Spray	0.17	0.04	0.13	0.28
Containers	1.50	1.76	2.57	1.76
Power & telephone	0.23	0.69	0.26	0.24
Other	0.08	6.11	0.08	3.98
Interest on working capital	0.29	1.70	0.30	0.82
Total variable cost	13.76	60.76	16.52	51.86
Fixed costs per ton				
Depreciation				
Equipment	2.89	2.76	2.50	2.37
Buildings	0.23	2.73	0.40	2.97
Interest on Investment				
Equipment	0.96	1.56	0.84	2.37
Buildings	0.11	4.09	0.49	2.97
Owned land	0.52	0.26	0.25	1.63
Land tax & rent	1.47	0.76	0.97	1.66
Total fixed cost	6.18	12.16	5.45	13.96
Total variable cost	13.76	60.76	16.52	51.86
Total cost per ton	19.94	72.92	21.97	65.82
(Excluding return to operator labor and management which for the project was considered the management staff)				

Yields

Acreages and yields for 1965 and 1966 are shown in Table 13.

In 1966 all yields except grain were below average, thus losses resulted even though cost per acre had been reduced. The extremely low yield of turnips and carrots was the result of not harvesting all the vegetables because immediate markets were lacking and a shortage of storage space was anticipated. The grain yields were quite good.

Income and Expenses 1965 and 1966

A statement of income and expenses for 1965 is given in Table 14. In this table the cost of summerfallow was separated from the other crops. Summerfallow is an investment for future crops. The loss per acre on all crops is due to extremely high labor costs and the fact that the crops were not marketed and in some cases (turnips and carrots) were not even harvested. Corn did not yield any crop because it was planted too late. In 1965 the actual cash loss was \$43,162.95. Table 15 gives a statement of income and expenses for 1966. In Table 15 summerfallow and raspberries have been separated from other costs, but not losses, because they both are investments for future years. In 1966 the actual cash loss was \$42,357.42. However, this analysis only goes to November 30, 1966, and most of the crop is still to be sold. Unless the labor efficiency increases, there will be a further loss; the cost of preparing the portatoes for sale will be more than the price received for them. The loss for the 1966 crop may approach \$75,000.00.

Labor Efficiency

Since labor accounts for such a large part of the costs, Table 16 has been included to show how the labor was used. Table 16

Table 13

ACREAGES AND YIELDS FOR 1965 AND 1966

Item	Acres	1965		1966	
		Total	Yield	Acres	Total
		Acre		Acre	
Potato	96	725 T	7.5 T	238.3	730 T
Turnip	21	100 T	4.8 T	8.4	1 T
Carrot	5	15 T	3.0 T	8.3	6 T
Bean				1.0	100 lb. 100 lb.
Cabbage				14.6	35 T
Hay				55.0	50 T
Barley				270.0	11,378 bus. 42.1 bus.
Oats				245.0	13,400 bus. 54.7 bus.
Summerfallow	221			671.0	
Onions				5.0	
Raspberry				4.4	
Corn	17			12.0	
Straw					98 T
Total acres	350			1,533.0	

Table 14

STATEMENT OF INCOME AND EXPENSES FOR 1965

Item	Potato	Carrot	Corn	Turnip	Summerfallow	Total
(in dollars)						
Income	18,647.81	18.18	—	21.25	—	18,687.24
Expenses						
Labor	29,953.14	2,339.93	959.31	6,930.94	401.28	40,584.60
Operating costs	19,242.55	574.15	803.21	1,780.72	1,376.17	23,776.80
Fixed costs	8,080.03	352.33	204.69	838.21	733.76	10,309.02
Total cost	58,555.97	3,266.41	1,967.21	9,549.87	2,511.21	75.850.67
Loss	38,627.91	3,248.23	1,968.21	9,528.62	—	53,371.97
Loss per acre	415.71	649.65	560.51	453.74	—	383.97
Cost per acre	—	—	—	—	11.90	—

Table 15

STATEMENT OF INCOME AND EXPENSES 1966

Income	Summerfallow	Oats	Barley	Turnips	Onions	Carrots
(in dollars)						
Sold	-	2,040.83	7,250.52	60.95	-	111.95
Inventory	-	3,847.50	-	-	-	-
Total Income	-	5,888.33	7,250.52	60.95	-	111.95
Expenses						
Labor	1,342.72	2,480.33	2,864.16	703.47	299.54	3,622.14
Operating Costs	1,755.07	7,861.98	8,795.33	388.51	241.36	1,094.16
Fixed Costs	992.52	961.17	1,004.47	183.47	54.64	256.21
Total Cost	4,090.31	11,663.48	12,664.96	1,275.45	595.54	4,972.51
Cost	4,090.31	5,755.15	5,414.44	1,214.50	595.54	4,860.56
Loss						
Loss per Acre		23.57	20.05	144.58	119.11	585.61
Cost per Acre		6.10				

Table 15 (continued)

STATEMENT OF INCOME AND EXPENSES 1966

Income	Potato	Hay	Cabbage	Rasp- berry	Beans	Corn	Total
(in dollars)							
Sold	2,200.35	323.90	2,057.51	-	3.16	-	14,049.17
Inventory	20,557.50	189.00	480.00	-	-	-	25,074.00
Total Income	22,757.85	512.90	2,537.51	-	3.16	-	39,123.17
Expenses							
Labor	24,193.96	1,137.31	4,090.24	3,531.44	128.54	201.87	44,955.72
Operating Costs	21,703.06	877.13	1,011.52	446.25	93.89	413.28	44,682.54
Fixed Costs	6,987.96	397.85	598.99	89.67	22.29	124.01	11,673.25
Total Cost	52,884.98	2,412.29	5,700.75	4,067.36	244.72	739.16	101,311.51
Cost	-	-	-	4,067.36	-	-	-
Loss	30,127.13	1,899.39	3,163.24	-	241.56	739.16	54,030.67
Loss per Acre		126.42	34.53	216.65	-	241.56	61.60
Cost per Acre		-	-	-	924.40	-	12.09

Table 16
LABOR EFFICIENCY IN 1965 AND 1966

Item	Acres	1965		Acres	1966	
		PMWU Acre	PMWU Crop		PMWU Acre	PMWU Crop
Potato	96	7.5	720	238.3	7.5	1,787
Turnip	21	7.5	158	8.4	7.5	63
Carrot	5	7.5	38	8.3	7.5	56
Bean	-	-	-	1.0	12.0	12
Cabbage	-	-	-	14.6	8.0	117
Hay	-	-	-	55.0	1.2	66
Barley	-	-	-	270.0	0.6	162
Oats	-	-	-	245.0	0.6	147
Summerfallow	211	0.6	127	671.0	0.6	403
Onion	-	-	-	5.0	7.5	38
Raspberry	-	-	-	4.4	5.0	22
Corn	17	4.5	76	12.0	4.5	54
Total	350	-	1,119	1,533.0	-	2,927
Man Equivalents			16.9			16.2
PMWU/ME			66.2			180.7

PMWU - Represents the amount of work that a man of normal efficiency should be expected to do in a 10 hour day.

Source: Earl Heady, Farm Records and Accounting, (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1962), p. 179.

shows labor efficiency for 1965 and 1966. The Productive Man Work Units (PMWU) are shown for each crop. The Man Equivalents (ME) are based on one worker or equivalent for ten hours per day, five days a week for a year. Although there may be some disagreement over these values, they were used for both years; thus the comparison between years is meaningful. Labor efficiency increased 273 percent in one year. This increase brings the Vegetable Project up to about one-half the labor efficiency normally expected.

The Vegetable Project has lost money for two years and will continue to lose money until labor expense and the management of labor can be brought under control. Because of the losses incurred and the reasons for these losses the author does not feel that there is nay need to do a more detailed analysis. Management and organization are now the limiting factors. Although the Vegetable Project shows up very poorly in an economic analysis, the author does not feel that the basic problems are economic. The physical facilities are all available for a profitable business. It is a social problem which results in the very low labor efficiency and the problems of labor management. The marketing of the produce has been the other main factor which has caused losses. This again is partly due to management's time being taken up with labor problems when time should have been spent developing markets.

Although the Vegetable Project is still losing money, there has been a tremendous increase in efficiency in only one year. Whether this increase can be continued depends to a large extent on what type of backing the Band members get from the various groups who are supposed to be supporting the Project.

CHAPTER VI

EVALUATION, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Areas of Change

In previous Chapters the author has stated the situation on the Reserve prior to 1965 and many of the problems necessitating a Community Development approach. A few areas in which change has taken place might be mentioned here in order to evaluate the progress that has been made with the Reserve's Community Development attempt--the Vegetable Project.

Government Wards and Welfare

A large proportion of the Reserve children are wards of the government. The percentage of the population who were wards of the government in 1964 and 1965--12 percent--was much higher than the provincial figure of 0.4 percent of the total population. In 1964 and 1965 the Federal Government spent \$24,000 on 48 children from the Enoch Band who were temporary and permanent wards of the government. By 1966 these figures had dropped to \$16,800 paid for 28 children, and much of this money was distributed for children who had been made permanent wards of the government previous to 1966. The percentage of the population listed as wards of the government dropped to 6.6 percent in about one and one-half years. It would appear that there is a correlation between the fact that the Vegetable Project supplies work on the Reserve, thus keeping men with their families and decreasing the percentage of children who are wards of the government. Families seem

far more stable now that men on the Reserve do not have to leave the Reserve in search of work.

Many members of the Band previously on welfare no longer have to solicit help from the Council at meetings. During the summer of 1966 the only people receiving welfare were mothers unable to work, older people, or people with physical handicaps. Before the Vegetable Project many homes on the Reserve seemed to be moving toward female domination. Usually the women decided how the cheques were to be spent; the man had little to do with management when he was out of work except to sign the cheque. The children had little respect for their fathers, and alcohol was used to solve the problem of idleness. When a man worked on the Vegetable Project to support his family, a sense of pride was generated. Thus it seems one of the goals of the Project, generating self-confidence, is being achieved.

Participation in the Project

In any Community Development scheme participation is an important criteria for success. Out of a total of 146 people on the voters list in 1966, there were at least 101 who had worked on the Project. Many of those who did not work on the Project were women with young children at home or elderly people. At least 210 Band members worked on the Project in either 1965 or 1966. No one was forced to work. For some people the Vegetable Project supplied year-round work. When compared with the national figure where 10 percent of the Indian people of Canada work year round, the Vegetable Project has a good record.¹

¹Canada, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, "The Indian Today," (Ottawa: 1964), p. 9.

Training

Though it is true that the Project has lost money, one must consider what has been gained from that loss. The Band members have gained some self-confidence; they have the feeling that they can do and will do a good job in the future. Compared to the cost of retraining programs--each student receives \$200 per month plus an additional \$80 per month to a married man with dependents who has to move to take a training course and \$10 a month tuition fee--the losses of the Vegetable Project are minimal. Five men held management positions for a year; this training can be estimated to be worth \$17,400. Since these people did not receive adequate training as children (the Governmental policy in force when the Band's adults were in school stated that no Indian child over 12 or 14 needed academic education), society must be prepared to pay more to train adults.

General Evaluation

General Procedures Associated With The Project

Technical aid--The proper procedures were used to interest people in the Project--the discussional stage of Community Development was satisfied--but insufficient technical background work was done. For example, the Project's first year began too late in the spring. The problem of marketing was not studied sufficiently. It was taken for granted that because vegetables had to be imported into Edmonton, the market for them was unlimited. Because of bad experiences with other vegetable growers in the area most buyers are reluctant to tie themselves to any one producer. Most growers are not large enough to assure buyers of a standard product for a few weeks. Because pressure is exerted on

the market by large supermarket chains, there is little chance for the small grower with an unstandardized product. As a result of the bad showing of the Vegetable Project in 1966 it is doubtful that any buyer would be willing to commit himself to buying Vegetable Project produce entirely, in the near future.

Another area in which technical counsel was warranted and not received was in the area of storage. Vegetables harvested in 1966 that could not be sold immediately because of the inavailability of markets were either stored or left in the fields. The space in the root cellar was inadequate and unsatisfactory for any of the vegetables except cabbage (which is holding up well at the time of writing). "Good storage of carrots [and other vegetables] for the fresh market has not yet been achieved by many growers."¹ This is the case with the Vegetable Project. No refrigeration was installed in the root cellar so it was impossible to control the temperature especially during the few warm days in the fall. Especially in the case of hand picked vegetables such as carrots and onions it was cheaper in 1966 to leave them in the fields than to allow them to decay in the root cellar since no markets were available. If vegetables are to be grown next year on a commercial basis, refrigeration must be installed in the root cellar, unless a market can be found ahead of time and the management is sure that they can deliver the vegetables on time and in the proper quantity and quality.

¹K.D. Porter, "Production Economics of Fresh Vegetables in Alberta," (Edmonton: Agricultural Extension Service, 1966), p. 17.

Land use--It is obvious from a study of land resources of the Enoch Band that if the Indian Affairs Branch wishes to maximize returns at the present time, the only policy to follow is to rent the land to non-Indian farmers for potato and other vegetable production. However, the best long run use of the land for Band members would be to farm it themselves, at least to use it and manage it themselves. For instance, to maximize returns in the long run from the Reserve land, the Reserve should continue to lease the rifle range to the government. On the other hand, the lease on Tomahawk Park should be renegotiated with another group showing more interest in recreational development. The Band might use some of its money to help finance a new organization wishing to develop Tomahawk Park, for the present Company does not seem to be seriously interested in the Park. The lease would be no problem since the lessee has not fulfilled his agreement. Though it is not likely that Band members could manage the Park since it is a special skill, some members, if interested, might get jobs in the Park and learn the business. From the point of view of development of human resources on the Reserve, all the land should be farmed, administered, and managed by members of the Band as quickly as feasible. Therefore, from this point of view it is essential that the Vegetable Project continue and that Band members be given more responsibility for it.

Organizational and Managerial Procedures

Not until June 28, 1966, were the responsibilities of the various positions associated with the Vegetable Project generally made known. These responsibilities were outlined by the Band Council, the body that according to the plan mapped out by the Superintendent and

Advisory Committee was to have no voice in the management of the Project, except to allocate money. However, the Council felt that some general guide was necessary for those holding managerial positions in the Project. The fact that there had been no such guide previous to 1966 was a serious organizational flaw.

The management of the Project needs a complete reevaluation and change if the Vegetable Project is to continue. Poor management has caused a loss of money, ill will, and dissatisfaction among Band members, and has left the Project without a strong organization on which it can rely. Certain parts of the present organization should be studied. It is important to look at the work of the Band Council, the Superintendent, and the Supervisor, for they are all important members of the managerial hierarchy. Since the Band Council was the nucleus, the center of any Community Development Project, it will be studied first.

The Band Council--The Band Council in office at the time of the first consideration of the Vegetable Project had a very close working relationship with the Agency Superintendent. Informal discussions were held, and a significant rapport existed between them. Some members of the old Council have described long and often heated discussion that took place while trying to decide what would be the best for the Band. However, after the election of June 1965 a new Council took office. Not one of the old Council members regained his seat. The new Council did not have the background of discussions and decisions on the Vegetable Project, thus they felt that they should move with caution. On three occasions the high cost of labor made additional funds necessary because the budget had been spent. The support of the new Band Council was not quite as enthusiastic as that of the old Council.

The Superintendent--At the same time as the change in the Band Council there was a change in Superintendents. The Superintendent who had supplied the backing for the decisions of the old Council was transferred. Though the acting Superintendent gave the Project official support, he differed greatly in personality from the previous Superintendent often referred to as a promoter. From the time of his arrival the new Superintendent brought with him the idea of slowing the Project down to take a second look at it. During his first several months in office he made several unfortunate statements to Band members. He told one of the Band members that "there must have been a madman running this place before I arrived." Since there was a strong feeling of goodwill towards the previous Superintendent, this statement caused many to believe that he had been sent out from Ottawa to stop the Project. Also his suggestions that the growth of the Project should be slowed down until the people were sure of what they wanted only aggravated the situation although the author believes he was correct.

At this point a slight aside to look at Agency relations with the Band would be valuable. The change in Superintendents was mentioned above; but the constant relationship of The Indian Affairs Branch Agency and its members with the Enoch Band has not been mentioned. Specifically concerning the Vegetable Project, several official meetings were held to discuss it with Band members and Agency staff present. In these formal meetings only previously discussed ideas--those carefully thought out and prepared--were brought up. There is very little time for busy staff members to sit around and discuss matters conversationally with the Band members, and informal discussions are the only way to encourage Band members to express themselves openly. The acting Superintendent has lived

on the Reserve for 13 years, but his time is so taken up with official matters that he has little time to discuss matters with Band members on a friendly basis. Over the years he has come to know the people on a personal basis, but the advantages which could have accrued to his position and his work as a receptive listener have largely been ruled out by the pressure of other work. Band members must try to catch him on Tuesday when he comes out to Council meetings or go into the Agency office in Edmonton. At the Agency office, the author noted, it seems as though anyone would stop working to help Band members. The type of relationship between Band members and Agency personnel that many of the people in Indian Affairs desire still does not exist. A Band member may come in to know if he can do something or to learn what the regulations are concerning some proposed scheme. He is accustomed to being told that there is nothing that Agency office can do; he must wait until they receive word from Ottawa. This happens so often that it makes the Agency office appear to be only a forwarding post for Ottawa. Many of the people in the Agency office seemed to be tired of sending everything to Ottawa and waiting months for an answer.

The Supervisor and general supervision--When considering the work of the Supervisor, there are several factors which should be kept in mind. The general duties of a Supervisor are usually considered to include: planning, organizing, controlling, communicating, delegating authority, accepting responsibility. In his contract the Supervisor agreed to supervise the growing of potatoes, vegetables, and small fruits. At no time was any mention made of grain or hay. In 1966 there were 535 acres of grain to be supervised and 55 acres of hay. He took this acreage on in the interest of the people and the Project in the

belief that the Farm Trust would be soon forthcoming. It is most unfortunate that the Farm Trust did not come through, for the Supervisor was unable to manage the total operation in a desirable manner because of the great number of duties he had to perform.

A second duty outlined in the contract stated that he was to train Indian labor to operate machinery and other phases of the work. The first part of this duty was easily accomplished because many of the men had worked on their own for local farmers and were familiar with machinery operation. If his work was to include training Band members in management and organization of the Vegetable Project, this aspect of the contract constituted a monumental undertaking. Vegetable production is a very difficult type of farming in which only the very best managers can compete. The training of a good manager cannot be accomplished in a few years by even the most interested and well educated people. Moreover, because the Supervisor followed certain southern Alberta practices, a feeling grew up among some of the people that he did not know how to grow vegetables. Some of his practices differed from those of local farmers, and these ideas were questioned. Because Band members had been told for many years that their ideas were not as good as the ideas of non-Indians, they often did not bring their suggestions out in the open.

The third duty stated was the marketing of all the produce on a profitable basis. This duty was one of the biggest problems. Quite often the cost of preparing the produce for sale was more than it would bring in the market due to the extremely high cost of labor in all operations. For example, the cost of harvesting \$3.16 worth of beans in 1966 was extremely high. A vegetable buyer must be able to rely upon the prompt delivery of vegetables, and the Vegetable Project has been unreliable

because of the uncertainty of labor. Until labor can be efficiently managed it will be impossible to develop a profitable enterprise.

The last duty outlined in the contract was to keep all records for audit and research purposes. Because of the number of different enterprises that the Supervisor had to control in the last year, he was not able to keep a set of books which allowed him to analyze the business. It was almost impossible for any of the Band members to work on the books because the auditor had them most of the time. The auditor kept the previous year's books that the Band members might have used to check to learn how things had been done. Many times the men in charge were not on the job, and others had to fill in and make decisions. Moreover, since they did not keep records as they went along, there were not accurate field records with which to compare bookkeeping entries. Field records are a necessity for an efficient farming operation.

The Supervisor has undertaken a very large and difficult job. He has allowed the Project to grow too rapidly and, as a result, has not been able to give the supervision which was required. The job is made doubly difficult because he has to take directions from so many people. He was in the impossible position of having as one of his chief advisors his Assistant Manager. This should not continue for another year. In the coming year the Supervisor will have to take a firm hold on the Project and keep it within an easily controllable size. Perhaps different management arrangements might facilitate a more efficient utilization of labor. At the present time a great many people on the Reserve are dissatisfied with the Supervisor because of the losses incurred in both years of operation. He will be working under the handicap of this general attitude in the coming year.

Supervision is an area in which inefficiency and laxness are most obvious. The consequences of a lack of supervision can be readily noticed. Organizing work and supervising it is a very difficult job in any organization, but it is especially difficult when it is tried for the first time. The Vegetable Project, a relatively new innovation, attempted to include all Band members, some of whom had not worked for three or four years. Because they had been idle, they had lost good working habits and the ability to function within an organization. The Indian community was, in years past, one of the most highly structured societies, each member having a function which required him to take part in the society. However, since this has not been the case for some years, organization and supervision will take more time and skill to develop good working habits.

Furthermore, in farming it is more difficult to carry out plans just as they are outlined than it is in other businesses. In the case of the Vegetable Project it is even more difficult due to the lack of knowledge of methods to be used and the lack of a work plan.

Discipline was often quite lax on the Project. Drinking was a serious problem and cost the Project a great deal of money. However, since no disciplinary action was taken against those drinking on the job, the problem became even more extensive than usual and obviously more pronounced than if firm action had been taken to stop it. Effective control and discipline were lacking in other aspects of the Project too. Workers knew that they would not be fired and seldom even reprimanded; thus bad work habits were built up. Since the Foreman might be absent for days, the bad work habits were allowed to grow. For example, the discipline of time meant little to Band members working on the Project.

They did not fully accept their responsibilities to the clock; working hours were not respected. A time clock, the result of a Band member's suggestion, made the workers aware that they had to be at work on time and remain at work until a certain hour or the time they had taken off would show up in their pay cheques.

Since part of the scheme was to teach members of the Band's good managerial practices, one would expect that some sort of a work plan would have been drawn up stating the work to be done and a date for its completion if the crops were to be a success. But such a plan to aid supervising work was not drawn up. Very sketchy ideas were set out verbally instead. Unfortunately, as mentioned before, a great many people had a voice in decision making for the Project. Each committee drew up a prospectus for the number of acres to be seeded, gave it to the manager, and expected him to carry out their wishes. One essential requirement for success on a project such as this one is that the people doing the work be given some authority in planning the operation and in deciding in what order things will be done. The Band members feel that the Project is theirs, but they feel that they were not given enough say in planning it after it was first started. People on the Reserve found it difficult to believe that people who had never been on the Reserve could make recommendations concerning what should be grown and in what quantity. Many Band members felt that the Advisory Committee resembled the people in Ottawa and slowly a feeling of ill will built up against Committee members.

To return to the problem of the lack of a work plan and supervision, the following example shows the chaos created by the lack of planning, supervision, and instruction. Some Band women were sent

out to hoe carrots. A few of the older women who had worked on other farms knew that they had to thin the carrots as they worked along the rows. Most of the younger people had no idea that this had to be done. When a Foreman came out to the field and saw that some of the women were behind the rest, he thought that they had been visiting instead of working and reprimanded the older women. When the older women explained why they were behind, the Foreman said that he had not been told about thinning the carrots. As a result, those thinning the carrots quit.

As is obvious from this example there were no distinct lines of authority within the Vegetable Project. Band members in postions of responsibility soon became middlemen, for there was no one to whom they could turn to back up their decisons. As field foremen they would give an order, and it would be countermanded by someone else in a short time. If someone questioned their directives, they had nowhere to turn for authorization. Therefore, with only a few exceptions subforemen tried to do as little as possible. Also delegation of authority only lasted for a few days at a time because of the high turnover of workers. In the mornings it was decided who would be in charge of certain jobs. He would then be sent out to organize the work in whatever way he thought best. However, most of the field workers had been there before, and it was not necessary to instruct them so most foremen did nothing.

It is obvious from the time cards that none of the people appointed to official positions would have been able to hold a job outside the Reserve. It must be remembered that this was the very reason that the Project was set up--to develop good work habits--and this lack of responsibility was one thing the Projct hoped to change. Change, however, will come slowly, especially because the Project is trying to change all the members of the community.

Communication--Both in the case of organizational procedures and in the case of managerial procedures there is an overlapping of problems. It is almost impossible to say where one ends and the other begins; they cannot be distinctly and separately defined. For example, in the area of communication, of the utmost importance in both the managerial and organizational aspects of any such Project, all channels were limited to oral transmission; there was no definite channel provided for written ideas and thus no record kept of many decisions. Also exclusively oral communication meant that special care had to be taken to see that people felt at ease to talk about their ideas and plans. The Supervisor worked very hard to assure adequate communication and seemed to be fairly successful in eliciting ideas from most people until the middle of the summer of 1966 when communication began to break down.

But communication had been inadequate long before the summer of 1966. For instance, the original ideas as planned by the Superintendent and the Band Council were not passed along to anyone else. Moreover, members of the Advisory Committee differed in their ideas about the goals of the Project. Members of the Farm Trust had different opinions; the Band members had a variety of ideas about what the Project was to do. Each group had factions within it. Though the goals finally stated by each group were often alike, they had very different ideas on how to implement these goals which were not communicated with each other.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Profit

The member of the Advisory Committee put one comment in their statement which has far-reaching effects on the Project and may be the one factor that will destroy it. The statement was made that

the Project was expected to show some profit by the third year. Based on technical data from the surrounding farmers and the information shown in Farm Cost Studies of the Provincial Government, this seemed like a fairly safe assumption to make. However, if any of the sociological implications had been taken into consideration, it is doubtful whether this statement would have been made. If there had been a Sociologist with some knowledge of the Band's social problems on the Committee, the clause on profit might not have been included. This statement on profit put great pressure on the Supervisor. He feels that unless he shows a profit by the third year he will have failed. Band members feel that they must meet the three-year deadline. Because of the profit deadline other goals are being discounted or ignored. At the time of writing with few exceptions everyone is concerned with making money in the third year. If the Committee had chosen a five year period for showing a profit, this sudden desire to make the Project look profitable would not have arisen at the cost of the other goals--one of which was the main reason for starting the Project.

If this desire to show a profit is carried full course, the author believes that the Project will soon wither away or be turned over to some outsider to take over completely. This would mean that the next time that someone wanted to get Band members interested in something for their own welfare, they would point to the Vegetable Project with justification and say that the Project cost a half million dollars and put them to work for nothing; so the Band is no longer interested in development schemes.

Certain suggestions to make the Project profitable were offered--for example, four or five men be appointed to do all the work on the Project and the acres of potatoes cut down to a size they would be able to handle along with the grain acreage. Under this scheme no vegetables would be planted. The author feels that there are two direct problems with this scheme beside the fact that it is contrary to the very goals of the Vegetable Project--developing a scheme which involves enough Band members to make it a community project and thus provide a basis for Community Development. In the first place the author does not feel that there are five men now living on the Reserve who can remain on the Reserve with its present social conditions and work on any Project regularly enough to make it a paying proposition. Secondly, after nearly all the people have had two years in which to make money on the Reserve, it is going to be very difficult for them to remain idle while five do all the work and get all the money. Even though at first most members may agree to this scheme, they will, after a few months, pressure those in charge to allow them to work.

It has also been suggested that since the Project has lost money for two years, it should be allowed to die as any other business would die. In the first place, it is not accurate to state that if a business loses money for the first two years, it will go bankrupt. Many successful businessmen will tell of losing money at first by learning from their mistakes, they were able to go on to success. Many things have been learned in the first two years. Management was spread too thin the second year; low yields resulted and no profit. A great many crops were tried the second year, perhaps too many, but now what can be grown successfully and marketed profitably is known. Most important, the members of

the Band know that they are capable of growing the crops; now they must make the operation operate efficiently. If the Project were allowed to die now it would do a great deal of harm, for it would only impress most people on the Reserve with the feeling that they could not be successful at the same type of farming their neighbors were doing. If this spirit comes to prevail on the Reserve it will be extremely hard for anyone to start a Project in the future no matter how impressive its prospects.

General recommendations

The first recommendation deals with the initial stages of any Community Development attempt--the nucleus group. A new nucleus group should be formed and then allowed to work out among themselves the goals of the Project. The group should include at least one woman, for they are a stabilizing influence on the Reserve. After this group has decided the direction of the Project, they can pass their ideas on to the rest of the Band. It is essential that no member of the nucleus group be also a member of the Band Council. The Project should not be tied to any one Council or to any of the factions on the Reserve. The personnel chosen by the Indian Affairs Branch and the Band Council must be aware of the technical as well as the social implications of their suggestions. By the first of May some definite policy should be evolved which will be satisfactory to the majority of the Band members and no time limit should be stated for changes to be made or goals to be met. In making these decisions, it must be kept in mind that the Enoch Band still has some of the same problems they had two years ago. If anything has occurred, their condition is generally worse due to the added money which the Project has made available to them.

Once the aim of the Project has been decided, a definite line of authority must be established. This line of authority and communication must be written down and a copy given to each person so that he understands his responsibilities. These responsibilities should be explained so that each person understands his job and where he stands in relation to the others on the team. Responsibility can only be accepted when responsibility has been defined.

Possibly one way of defining specific responsibility would be to give certain groups specific crops to look after and for which they would be entirely responsible. One man might be put in charge of a field of potatoes, and it would be his responsibility to plant the crop and see to it that it was profitable. He could hire anyone he wished, and he would be responsible for their efficiency on all hand labor. The field work done by tractors could be planned at meetings each Friday for the coming week. It would be the Supervisor's job to see that the Friday meetings planned the work for the coming week to the best advantage of the machinery and the people. The men in charge of the field would get the same wage as the field workers and also get a share of the profit at the end of the year. Because some men would have different sized fields and different amounts of work to do, they might work another man's field if asked. Each fieldman would be responsible for keeping the records on his field and would not be paid until his records were accurate. The first year the fields could be allocated by a draw; thereafter, the man with the highest percent return on his field might have his pick of the fields for the coming year. The most inefficient farmers would lose their right to a field, and it would be given to others that were applying for a field or if no one wanted it, to the most successful man. The main advantage of

this scheme is that it allows for some personal achievement and will reward a man who works hard. In the present scheme all were paid the same whether they slept under a bush or worked hard. It might also be possible to have some system in which the workers receive a certain percentage of the profit from the most successful fields so that in the next year they would want to work for the good managers even though they might have to work a little harder. If a fieldman is not on the job when he should be, the Supervisor in consultation with two other fieldmen can do whatever is necessary, and the field will be charged with both the fieldmen's labor.

Finally, a smaller but no less important aspect of the Project has been reviewed and found wanting--bookkeeping methods. A different approach is going to have to be taken in regard to bookkeeping. At the present time the books are not accurate, and none of the Band members are learning how to manage from the books kept. If various committees feel that the I.B.M. bookkeeping system has some advantages, it should remain in force. However, the author feels that people on the Reserve must learn what these figures mean; they can only learn bookkeeping from doing the books and learning what goes into each section and why. It is impractical to expect people who have little, if any, experience with bookkeeping to be able to read the I.B.M. reports when they do not understand what went into them and when not one of the reports has been free of mistakes. The regular bookkeeping procedures recommended by the Agricultural Economic Branch of the Provincial Department of Agriculture are probably the best type of records for the Project at this time.

The non-Indians involved with this Project, through extremely poor communication and organization between themselves and with the Band members, have not given the Band members the help which they need and desire. To scrap the Vegetable Project or to turn it over to a private organization to run would be ridiculous and sad, and furthermore, disastrous for the egos of Band members. It would only add one more item to the list of failures for the Enoch Band. Certainly it would be easier, financially more secure, but when one looks at the goals or the reasons stated for the inception of this Project, neither of these alternatives would solve anything and thus there would be no meaning to two years of work.

APPENDIX I

Certain sections of the Indian Act relevant to this study have been included here. They are directly reproduced.

19. The Minister may

- (a) authorize surveys of reserves and the preparation of plans and reports with respect thereto,

TRESPASS ON RESERVES

30. A person who trespasses on a reserve is guilty of an offense and is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding fifty dollars or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one month or to both fine and imprisonment. 1951, c. 29, s. 30.

SALE OR BARTER OF PRODUCE

32.(1) A transaction of any kind whereby a band or a member thereof purports to sell, barter, exchange, give or otherwise dispose of cattle or other animals, grain or hay, whether wild or cultivated, or root crops or plants or their products from a reserve in Manitoba, Saskatchewan or Alberta, to a person other than a member of that band, is void unless the superintendent approves the transaction in writing.

MANAGEMENT OF INDIAN MONEYS

64. With the consent of the council of a band, the Minister may authorize and direct the expenditure of capital moneys of the band.

- (a) to distribute per capita to the members of the band an amount not exceeding fifty per cent of the capital moneys of the band derived from the sale of surrendered lands,
- (b) to construct and maintain roads, bridges, ditches and water courses on the reserves or on surrendered lands,
- (c) to construct and maintain outer boundary fences on reserves,
- (d) to purchase land for use by the band as a reserve or as an addition to a reserve,
- (e) to purchase for the band the interest of a member of the band in lands on a reserve,
- (f) to purchase livestock and farm implements, farm equipment, or machinery for the band,

- (g) to construct and maintain on or in connection with a reserve such permanent improvements or works as in the opinion of the Minister will be of permanent value to the band or will constitute a capital investment,
- (h) to make to members of the band, for the purpose of promoting the welfare of the band, loans not exceeding one-half of the total value of
 - (i) the chattels owned by the borrower, and
 - (ii) the land with respect to which he holds or is eligible to receive a Certificate of Possession, and may charge interest and take security therefor,
- (i) to meet expenses necessarily incidental to the management of lands on a reserve, surrendered lands and any band property,
- (j) to construct houses for members of the band, to make loans to members of the band for building purposes with or without security and to provide for the guarantee of loans made to members of the band for building purposes, and
- (k) for any other purpose that in the opinion of the Minister is for the benefit of the band. 1951, c. 29, s. 64.

66.(1) With the consent of the council of a band, the Minister may authorize and direct the expenditure of revenue moneys for any purpose that in his opinion will promote the general progress and welfare of the band or any member of the band.

68.(1) The Governor in Council may by order permit a band to control, manage and expend in whole or in part its revenue moneys and may amend or revoke any such order.

88.(1) Subject to this Act, the real and personal property of an Indian or a band situated on a reserve is not subject to charge, pledge, mortgage, attachment, levy, seizure, distress or execution in favour or at the instance of any person other than an Indian.

94. An Indian who

- (a) has intoxicants in his possession,
- (b) is intoxicated, or
- (c) makes or manufactures intoxicants off a reserve, is guilty of an offence and is liable on summary conviction to a fine of not less than ten dollars and not more than fifty dollars or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months or to both fine and imprisonment. 1951, c. 29, s. 94.

114. The Minister may

- (a) provide for and make regulations with respect to standards for buildings, equipment, teaching, education, inspection and discipline in connection with schools,
- (b) provide for the transportation of children to and from school,

(c) enter into agreements with religious organizations for the support and maintenance of children who are being educated in schools operated by those organizations, and
(d) apply the whole or any part of moneys that would otherwise be payable to or on behalf of a child who is attending a residential school to the maintenance of that child at that school. 1951, c. 29, s. 114.


116. An Indian child is not required to attend school if the child

(e) is unable to attend school because there is insufficient accommodation in the school that the child is entitled or directed to attend. 1951, c. 29, s. 116.

APPENDIX II

Any person on the Reserve who makes a decision affecting members of the Band must keep in mind its affect on the different families. Figure 1 shows that these families are very complicated. Because of the many family interrelationships and the strong family ties of the Band members it is very difficult for any one Band member to choose another Band member for a job, to run machinery, or to receive more money. It is very difficult to fire your relations, and, as one can see, most people are related. This chart only shows the immediate family relationships, but since most children live or frequently visit their aunts and uncles during childhood they feel that they are part of that family also. Their family feeling towards the relatives of their aunts and uncles is as strong as for their own relatives. The overall result is that most people on the Reserve are part of a large family group and so are forced by social pressure to help their families whenever they can. Thus an efficient use of human resources is almost impossible.

PRIMARY RELATIVE LINKS BETWEEN FAMILY UNITS IN ENOCH BAND



APPENDIX III

This letter to the editor of the Edmonton Journal was included to reinforce the point that pride in his home, his Project, his people, and himself is as important to a Band member as it is to any human being.

January 25th, 1967 - Edmonton Journal

Indian replies

I refer to the letter in The Journal from "Tired White."

Yes, a few of our people do thumb rides into the city, but don't judge our whole reservation by these few.

True, we have a few people who would rather sit on their porch steps and smoke. But these are our older people; they have done their share in making our reserve a better one, and we of the younger generation owe it to them to help them in their old age.

The pensioners are provided with wood and coal, and power bills are paid by the reserve. We do not get any assistance from any government for this.

None of the band members on our reserve are on federal or provincial government welfare. If there are any band members in need of assistance, we give them aid through our band funds. Our reserve is fortunate to have oil and gas in the land, and through agricultural and surface leases we derive revenues. From these revenues we make up an annual band budget. In this budget we include a certain amount of money for welfare assistance for band members. Only after that are the sick and the crippled put on relief.

As for the women, most of them do lots of canning, planting gardens, sewing and everything else white women do.

We don't like the word Tired White used to describe the Indians. We don't think there is anyone or anything "useless."

We recommend that anyone who believes Tired White's letter come out to the Stony Plain Indian Reserve at Winterburn and view our vegetable project, our new council building and band office, and our people who work in these places. Then write to The Journal as to what you really see.

Winterburn

Winterburn Indian

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